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PREFACE
Among the many noteworthy results of contemporary 
analytic philosophy are logical positivism, ideal lan­
guage theory, ordinary language analysis, symbolic logic, 
the new mathematics, empirio-pragraatism in physical 
science, refinements in axiological theory, and interest­
ing developments in epistemology.
George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne (1685-1753), and 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), outstanding among criti­
cal and analytic philosophers, did much to prepare the 
ground for this rich contemporary harvest. In an impor­
tant sense much of Wittgenstein's work can be seen as a 
logical development of Berkeley's major doctrines. I 
shall review and compare the ontological, episteraological, 
linguistic, and psychological aspects of the major works 
of the two thinkers, showing in what respects their find­
ings are similar and in what respects they are dissimilar.
The value of a comparative analysis lies in the 
fact that the treatment of a given problem by one of the 
two philosophers often clarifies and amplifies the treat­
ment of an identical or at least similar problem by the 
other. The essentially modern thrust of Berkeley’s think­
ing is made clear. Further, the comparison points up pat­
terns of continuity in philosophical investigation.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Berkeley’s and Wittgenstein's works are listed below in
the order in which they appear in the text.
S Berkeley, Siris, Given by section number,
PC Berkeley, Philosophical Commentaries. Given by
entry number. An asterisk (*) following PC 
entries indicates that punctuation has been in­
serted and/or spelling and grammatical changes 
have been made to make Berkeley's notes more intel­
ligible.
A Berkeley, The Analyst. Given by section number.
BB Wittgenstein, The Blue Book. Given by page number.
PHK Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of
Human Knowledge. Given by section number.
T Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
Given by entry number. Ogden translation unless 
otherwise indicated.
DHP Berkeley, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philo-
nous. Given by dialogue number and page number.
PI Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. Refer­
ences from Part 1 are given by the entry number. 
Those from Part 11 are given by section number 
(small Roman numeral) and page number.
TVV Berkeley, ^  Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision.
Given by section number.
vi
A l e . Berkeley, Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher 
Given by dialogue number and page number.
DM Berkeley, De Motu. Given by section number.
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BERKELEY AND WITTGENSTEIN: 
SOME CORRELATIONS
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Both Berkeley and Wittgenstein use the language 
model as a gateway through which the philosopher passes 
to arrive at the solution or dissolution of philosophical 
problems. Since they both claim that there is a qualified 
language-thought-reality isomorphism, they endeavor to 
cast light on philosophical problems which, in part, stem 
from the language in which they are expressed. If the 
nature, functions, uses, and abuses of the language model 
are understood, claim both philosophers, the underlying 
metaphysical and epistemological problems will either be 
resolved or be shown up as pseudo-problems. It is pos­
sible to reason analogically from that which is clear, 
i.e., the language model, to a more complete understanding 
of that which is less clear, i.e., the concepts expressed 
by the language. Berkeley remarks that
The phenomena of nature, which strike on 
the senses and are understood by the mind, form 
not only a magnificent spectacle, but also a 
most coherent, entertaining, and instructive 
discourse; and to effect this, they are con­
ducted, adjusted; and ranged by the greatest 
wisdom. This language or discourse is studied 
with different attention and interpreted with 
different degrees of skill. But so far as
men have studied and remarked its rules, and 
can interpret right, so far they may be said 
to be knowing its nature.1
He compares the phenomena of nature which are per­
ceived as sense data to the language-model in which the 
words stand as signs to the concepts signified. Sense 
data, according to Berkeley, are the phenomena of nature. 
The linguistic formulations of the sequences in which 
sense data occur are the laws of nature. Laws of nature 
are analogous to the grammatical rules of the language 
being utilized. Both are initially descriptive, not pre­
scriptive.
Wittgenstein uses two different language models in 
the course of his philosophical development. He uses a 
picture-model theory of language in the Tractatus and be­
lieves that the comprehensive understanding and use of 
this model will bring about the dissolution of philosoph­
ical problems by showing that they are without sense.
Later, Wittgenstein rejects the picture-model as inadequate 
and, in the Philosophical Investigations, replaces it with 
the model of language-games. The body of this text is an 
examination and comparison of the ways in which Berkeley 
and Wittgenstein interpret the language models and of the 
conclusions which they draw.
The two philosophers worked in similar intellectual 
millieus. Berkeley, and his contemporaries in the
^S, sec. 254.
3intellectual world, were influenced by the mathematical 
philosophies of Galileo, Descartes, Leibniz, and Newton. 
The episteraological theories advanced by Descartes, Locke, 
and Malebranch were also topics for polemical writings.
In the British Isles, the predominant tendency was to view 
and analyze man and the world in terms of a mechanical 
model. This period was characterized by antischolastic 
criticism and by epistemological investigation. Inquiry 
into the scope, methods, and structure of knowledge came 
as a natural result of the expansion of science which re­
quired an acute examination of its first principles.
Berkeley's predisposition for independent thinking 
along with his critical, inquiring turn of mind enabled 
him to become an apt student of the new science, but also 
an independent critic of the mainstream of contemporary 
thought. He remarks in his notebooks: "I was distrustful
at eight years old and Consequently by Nature disposed for 
these new D o c t r i n e s . A t  first he received the new doc­
trines of science with enthusiasm, and was enchanted by 
the demonstrative power of mathematical reasoning. Soon, 
however, he turned his attention to the philosophy of 
mathematics, convinced that the basic mathematical princi­
ples then accepted were confused or unintelligible. As 
evidenced in The Analyst, Berkeley is of the opinion that
2pc, 266.
4logic lies at the foundation of mathematics, and that bad 
logic cannot result in good science, even though it 
occasionally leads to satisfactory results. He tells the 
mathematicians that
I have no controversy about your conclusions, 
but only about your logic and method. . . .  I 
beg leave to repeat and insist, that I consider 
the geometrical analyst as a logician. . . .
And, forasmuch as it may perhaps seem an un­
accountable paradox that mathematicians should 
deduce true propositions from false principles, 
be right in the conclusion and yet err in the 
premises; I shall endeavour particularly to 
explain why this may come to pass, and show 
how error may bring forth truth, though it 
cannot bring forth science.3
Wittgenstein, in the first quarter of the twentieth 
century, was influenced by the anti-Hegelian, anti- 
metaphysical reaction, and by the second phase of the 
scientific revolution. The evolutionary theories of Dar­
win and Lamarck, Einstein's theory of relativity, and 
Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy combined to super­
sede the mechanical model which followed in the wake of 
Newtonian mechanics. The twentieth century is also an era 
of epistemological investigation, as the new scientific 
doctrines necessitate another re-evaluation of first 
principles.
Like Berkeley, Wittgenstein's early interests were 
focused on mathematics and the logical foundation of mathe­
matics. He shared Berkeley's anti-metaphysical bias and
3
A, sec. 20.
his preference for a common-sense epistemology. Berkeley 
notes that it is necessary "to fx! eternally banishing 
metaphysics and recalling men to common s e n s e . I n  a 
similar vein Wittgenstein comments that "one can defend 
common sense against the attacks of philosophers only by
solving their p u z z l e s .
The theses which I have chosen to emphasize in this 
comparative study of Berkeley and Wittgenstein can best be 
understood if we follow the logical sequence of their 
development from the object pole of experience to the sub­
ject pole of experience. Thus, I show how both thinkers 
work through the language model to an ontic foundation, 
how the signs and symbols which have an ontological basis 
form elements of the language. By focusing attention on 
ordinary language, one can resolve certain metaphysical 
puzzles which have confounded generations of philosophers, 
claim both Berkeley and Wittgenstein. An analysis of the 
roles played by grammar, logic, and propositions in the 
language model, is the source of the similar epistemolo­
gical position at which the two men arrive. Both have a 
contextualist-instrumentalist theory of meaning, which 
encompasses a theory of truth. Finally, in their respec­
tive treatments of the subject-pole of experience, both 
Berkeley and Wittgenstein resort to phenomenological analysis
4PC, 751.
SpB, 58-59.
6Of primary importance to both men is the correction
of prior philosophical error. Berkeley feels that this
critical activity prepares the ground for the reception of
true doctrine, i.e., the doctrine of immaterialism. This,
he claims, accords with common sense, and is easily seen
once the language-model is employed. He writes:
And I give it you on my word, since this revolt 
from metaphysical notions to the plain dictates 
of Nature and common sense, I find my under­
standing strangely enlightened, so that I can 
now easily comprehend a great many things which 
before were all mystery and riddle.6
Unlike Berkeley, Wittgenstein offers no positive 
doctrine. He claims that the proper understanding of the 
language and of the logic of the language is sufficient to 
dissolve all philosophical problems. There are no ques­
tions left, hence no need for explanation.
Philosophy simply puts everything before us, 
and neither explains nor deduces anything. . . .
Since everything lies open to view there is 
nothing to explain.
* *  *
The real discovery is the one that makes me 
capable of stopping doing philosophy when I 
want to. . . . The one that gives philosophy 
peace, so that it is no longer tormented by 
questions which bring itself in question.?
bpHP, I, p. 172. 
^Pl, 126 and 133.
CHAPTER II
ONTOLOGY
Before turning attention to the analysis of the 
structure of the language-model itself, both Berkeley and 
Wittgenstein look through the language-model to its ontic 
foundation. Things and ideas, for Berkeley, and facts and 
objects, for Wittgenstein, comprise the world. These are 
the entities which form the referents of any possible sym­
bolic system. Language, which is thought expressed, is 
the symbolic system through which the world becomes intel­
ligible. The philosophical problem to be solved, as both 
Berkeley and Wittgenstein see it, is the relation obtain­
ing between world and language. Difficulties arise because 
language is a part of the world. It is not only the human 
activity that makes the world intelligible, but it is inex­
tricably involved in the world-complex. Language, in one 
of its modes, serves as a tool of analysis, but at the same
time it shapes the world it is analysing. Thus the dis­
tinction between language and world is, of necessity, 
only a conceptual distinction.
Berkeley begins his discussion of the most general
categories of being by noting that
. . . nothing seems of more importance, towards 
erecting a firm system of sound and real know­
ledge, which may be proof against the assaults
of scepticism,' than to lay the beginning in a
8distinct explication of what is meant by thing, 
reality, existence. . . . Thing or being is
the most general name of all, it comprehends
under it two kinds entirely distinct and heter­
ogeneous, and which have nothing in common but 
the name, to wit, spirits and ideas.1
Thing, as Berkeley uses the term, means reality, hence
intelligibility. In his own words, thing means either
"ideas or that which has i d e a s . I d e a s  and that which
has ideas comprise the world. The first of the two kinds
of things that are to be met with in reality, minds or
spirits, will be discussed in Chapter VII. Ideas are the
next topic to be considered. For Berkeley,
. . . Idea is the object or subject of thought.
What I think on, whatever it be, I call idea.
Thought itself, or thinking is no idea. 'Tis 
an act.'^
I take the word idea for any the /si£7 
immediate object of sense or understanding, 
in which large signification it is commonly 
used by the moderns.4
Idea has three important kinds of meanings for 
Berkeley. First, idea includes in its signification all
of the sensual qualities, i.e., sight, sound, touch, taste
and smell. The internal sensations are included as well, 
i.e., pain, hunger, fear, etc. Secondly, the term includes 
in its signification ordinary objects in the world which 
are congeries of sense qualities. Examples of these are 
table, my body, events of history, the sight and aroma of
IPHK, sec. 89. 2 ^ ,  369.
3
PC, 808. 4n t v , sec. 45.
9a broiled steak. Objects of imagination and memory are 
included as a sub-class. Berkeley notes that in ordinary 
usage an "idea is the picture of the imagination's making. 
This is the likeness of and referred to the real idea, or 
(if you will) thing."5 this passage Berkeley intends
to show how his use of the terra idea differs from the 
ordinary usage. In the narrow sense, we say that we have 
an idea of something when thought or imagination or under­
standing has acted upon raw sensation. Thing, in the 
passage cited above, means simply the given in experience, 
uninterpreted by thought. In the broad sense, or in 
Berkeley's usage of the terras, idea replaces thing. Berke­
ley explains why he stipulates a broader usage for the 
term idea.
First, because the term thing in contradis­
tinction to idea is generally supposed to de­
note somewhat existing without the mind; se­
condly, because thing hath a more comprehensive 
signification than idea, including spirits or 
thinking things as well as ideas. Since, 
therefore, the objects of sense exist only in 
the mind, and are withall thoughtless and in­
active, I chose to mark them by the word idea, 
which implies those properties.6
Berkeley clarifies his usage of the language because 
he feels that philosophers have been led into error, par­
ticularly into the positing of odd entities such as 
material substance, by misunderstanding the grammar of the 
language. He points out that "the referring ideas to
5 6
PC, 657a. PHK, sec. 39.
10
things which are not ideas, the using of the terra idea of, 
is one great cause of m i s t a k e . T h e  preposition of used 
in this way leads us to think that there must be some ex­
ternal thing to which our idea can he referred for compar­
ison. Berkeley acknowledges that it sounds harsh, even 
ridiculous, to say that we eat and drink ideas and are 
clothed with them because the word idea is not used this 
way in ordinary discourse. But even so, propositions are 
more accurately stated in Berkeley's terms because
. . . ¥e are fed and clothed with those things 
which we immediately perceive by our senses.®
Color, figure, motion, extension and the 
like, considered only as so many sensations in 
the mind, are perfectly known, there being 
nothing in them which is not perceived. But 
if they are looked on as notes or images, re­
ferred to things or archetypes existing with­
out the mind, then are we involved all in
skepticism.9
The word thing as comprising or standing 
for idea and volition is useful, but as stand­
ing for idea and archetype without the mind, 
is mischievous and u s e l e s s . 10
The above summary account exemplifies Berkeley's use 
of language analysis to dispel philosophical puzzlement.
It is the grammar of the language that leads philosophers 
to postulate odd entities such as Locke's material sub­
stance and Descartes' res extensa.
7pC, 660. QpHK, sec. 38.
QpHK, sec. 87. lOpg^ 689.
11
The third sense of the meaning of the term idea is, 
for Berkeley, the ontological rather than the logical one. 
Ideas themselves are signs. They are the signs in the 
language of God, the author of nature, the source of ex­
perience. The origin of ideas as signs, in this sense, 
is transcendental. According to Berkeley, the objective 
pole of experience is public and universal because the ideas
f
perceived by finite minds signify the course of nature 
which is the language by which God communicates to man.
Ideas are the marks of God's divine sensible language.
Just as Berkeley's most general category of being 
is signified by the term thing, Wittgenstein's most gen­
eral category of being is signified by the term fact. In 
the Tractatus, Wittgenstein explains his views as follows:
The world is everything that is the case.
. . . The world is the totality of facts, not 
of things. . . . The totality of existent 
atomic facts is the world. . . . The existence 
and non-existence of atomic facts is the 
reality. . . . The total reality is the world.
The complex facts of which the world is composed 
can be analyzed into atomic facts. By substitution above, 
the totality of atomic facts is reality. These general 
designations differ in that Wittgenstein's term atomic 
fact includes a logical connotation that Berkeley's term 
thing lacks. Wittgenstein defines an atomic fact as a 
complex of .objects in relation. The possibility, of
11t , 1, 1.1, 2.04, 2.06 and 2.063.
entering into definite relations is inherent in the objects;
thus atomic facts are ordered and impose that order on any
possible symbolic representation. The ontological, in
effect, determines the logic of the language and shows
itself in any possible language. Wittgenstein makes this
point in the Tractatus by stating that
. . . An atomic fact is a combination of objects 
(entities, things). . . .  In the atomic fact 
the objects hang one in another, like the links 
of a chain. . . .  In the atomic fact the objects 
are combined in a definite w a y . 12
Wittgenstein’s views parallel Berkeley's to the 
extent that they both insist that there is an order and 
definiteness in experience which expresses itself in sym­
bolic representation, yet the facts are independent of one 
another. We cannot infer one fact from another, nor can 
we say that one fact causes another. Wittgenstein writes 
that "Atomic facts are independent of one another."13 
Berkeley expresses the same view by remarking, "I think 
not that things fall out of necessity. The connection of 
no two ideas is necessary."14 Thus neither finds neces­
sity at the object pole of experience. Experience is given 
as separate, unique drops or atoms, among which there is 
no discernible necessary connection.
^‘^ T, 2.01, 2.03, and 2.031.
13r, 2.061.
^.^PC, 884.
13
When asked to give a concrete example of an atomic 
fact, Wittgenstein replies that this is the business of 
empirical psychology, not of philosophy. He does claim 
that atomic facts are combinations of objects; thus an 
examination of Wittgenstein's use of the term object 
should help clarify the concept of atomic fact. Wittgen­
stein uses the term object in three major senses. These 
are similar to the three ways in which Berkeley uses the 
term idea. First, object refers to an individual sense 
datum.
A speck in a visual field need not be red, 
but it must have a colour. . . .  A tone must 
have a pitch, the object of the sense of touch 
a hardness, etc.15
This coincides exactly with Berkeley's use of the terra
idea to mark sense data. Secondly, Wittgenstein uses the
term object to mark clusters of sense data which are
ordinarily referred to as things. An object in this sense
would be a table, a shoe, a pickle. This corresponds to
Berkeley's second usage of the term idea. Wittgenstein
has been accused of inconsistency because he also asserts
that the object is simple, and the things of everyday life
are c o m p l e x . 16 This same charge could be made against
l^T, 2.0131.
16cf. Alexander Mas low, A Study in Wittgenstein's 
Tractatus (Berkeley; University of California Press, 
1961), p. 11.
"But 'The object is simple' (2.02), while things of 
everyday life are obviously complex, and thus while we may
14
Berkeley. However, the objection loses its force if we 
take into account the fully developed views of both 
philosophers about the nature and functions of language. 
When we talk about the simplicity or complexity of a terra 
out of any context, we are talking nonsense. A term takes 
its meaning from the language game in which it is being 
used. Meaning and context are inseparable. The simpli­
city or complexity of a term is a function of the con­
crete prepositional expression in which it is to be found.
The third sense in which Wittgenstein uses the term 
object is the metaphysical sense, which again parallels 
Berkeley's view. Wittgenstein writes that
Objects form the substance of the world.
Therefore they cannot be compound. . . .  If 
the world had no substance, then whether a 
proposition had sense would depend on whether 
another proposition was true. . . .  It would 
then be impossible to form a picture of the 
world (true or false). . . .  It is clear that 
however different from the real one an imagined 
world may be, it must have something— a form—  
in common with the real world. . . . This 
fixed form consists of the objects.
speak of things as objects in the sense of referends of 
the terms of our language, they cannot be considered as 
the ultimate elements of experience. And even if we de­
cide that by objects Wittgenstein does not always mean 
the ultimate elements of the world. It would still be 
advisable not to use the terras 'things' and 'elements' 
/I.e., use the term objects as synonoraous with both/ 
interchangeably because these terms have different log­
ical properties."
I'^ T, 2.021, 2.0211, 2.0212, 2.022, and 2.023.
15
Although in a mode quite different from Berkeley's 
doctrine of divine sensible language, Wittgenstein is 
nonetheless making ontological claims. He is asserting 
something about the world; namely, that there is given an 
objective formal structure which determines experience to 
some degree. He is saying that if there were no form to 
the world, the coherence theory of truth would be the only 
possible truth-theory. But in this case it would be im­
possible to make any true or false statements about the 
world. One could only remark on the consistency of pro­
positions with other propositions. In such a case Witt­
genstein's entire theory of truth-functions, one of the 
most fruitful results of his work, would be completely un­
founded. Further, Wittgenstein remarks:
The world is independent of my will. . . .
Logic is not a theory but a reflexion of the 
world. Logic is transcendental. . . .  In 
the picture and the pictured there must be 
something identical in order that the one may 
be a picture of the other at all. . . . This 
fixed form consists of the objects. . . . .
There is only logical necessity,
How things stand is God.19
For Berkeley, ideas in the metaphysical sense refer 
to God's divine sensible language, and determine the ob­
jectivity and universality of experience. Wittgenstein's 
objects serve the same metaphysical function. God is "how
1®T, 6.373, 6.13, 2.161, 2.023 and 6.37.
p. 79.
16
things stand” and how things do actually stand determines 
the logic of the symbolic representation of experience 
used in the language models of both philosophers.
In summation, Berkeley's things and Wittgenstein's 
atomic facts serve similar purposes in their respective 
expositions. Both are the most general descriptive cate­
gories of reality, yet both are further analyzable into 
more fundamental components, Wittgenstein's doctrine of 
atomic facts reflects the extensive development of modern 
logic. Facts carry the connotation of the inextricable 
logical bond between any possible language (or thought) 
and the world, a bond which is not explicitly included in 
Berkeley's discussion of the term things. Berkeley's terra 
things includes in its extension that class of entities 
which cannot be objectified, i.e., self, other selves, and 
infinite spirit. There is no similar connotation in Witt­
genstein's atomic fact.
There is an even closer correspondence between the 
uses and meanings of the pair of terms idea and obj ect as 
used by Berkeley and Wittgenstein, respectively. Both 
terms serve as the ontological foundation upon which the 
structure of human knowledge is erected. The uses and 
meanings of this pair of terms are clarified by the use of 
the language model. The three major meanings of the pair 
of terras for both philosophers are: (l) sense data;
(2 ) physical objects which are combinations of sense data;
17
and (3) metaphysical objects which guarantee the determi­
nateness of sense experience and the universality of ex­
perience. The signs and symbols of which language and 
thought are comprised refer to the ideas and objects.
CHAPTER III 
SIGNS AND SYMBOLS
Both Berkeley and Wittgenstein consider signs to he 
the bridge between being and knowing. Berkeley begins the 
development of his theory of signs in ^  Essay Towards a 
New Theory of Vision, but for didactic reasons does not 
complete it until he presents his full doctrine of irama- 
terialisra in the Principles of Human Knowledge. The most 
fundamental meaning of the term sign is introduced ana­
logically through the language model.
Upon the whole, 1 think we may fairly conclude 
that the proper objects of vision constitute an 
universal language of the Author of nature, 
whereby we are instructed how to regulate our 
actions in order to attain those things that are 
necessary to the preservation and well-being of 
our bodies, as also to avoid whatever may be 
hurtful and destructive of them. It is by 
their information that we are principally guided 
in all the transactions and concerns of life.
And the manner wherein they signify and mark
unto us the objects which are at a distance is 
the same with that of language and signs of 
human appointment, which do not suggest the 
things signified by any likeness or identity 
of nature, but only be an habitual connexion 
that experience has made us to observe between 
them.^
The above paragraph contains a number of Berkeley’s 
key ideas. First, when a person of normal vision uses that
faculty under normal conditions, certain data are perceived.
^NTV, sec. 147.
18
19
The basic elements of these data are color, figure, and 
relative motion or rest. These data are independent of 
the will of the perceiver, and he is aware that he does 
not cause them. Therefore, these ideas have an external 
source. Berkeley claims that no idea can be in a thought­
less or senseless thing, and an idea can resemble only 
another idea. For these reasons, Berkeley claims, the 
source of our ideas must be some mind or some thinking 
being which is external to our own minds. The source of 
our ideas must be God. It follows that our individual 
ideas are signs, and the totality of our ideas, including 
their relations, sequences, and order, comprises the lan­
guage of the author of nature. God speaks to man directly 
by means of visual and other sensual signs. These are, 
so to speak, the end of the line.
In vain do we extend our view into the 
heavens, and pry into the entrails of the 
earth, in vain do we consult the writings 
of learned men, and trace the dark footsteps 
of antiquity; we need only draw the curtain 
of words, to behold the fairest tree of know­
ledge, whose fruit is excellent, and within 
the reach of our hand.^
Neither our science nor our scholars nor the writ­
ings of the past can bring us knowledge in the strict 
sense. ¥e gain that knowledge by attending to the sensory 
signs by means of which God communicates with man. We 
must attend to these signs with a mind free of the preju­
dices of the past which are built into the common language.
^PHK, Introduction, sec. 24.
20
By showing that ideas are objects, and that the proper 
objects of the senses are the marks or signs of God’s di­
vine sensual language, Berkeley claims that he has refuted 
scepticism. The refutation of relativism follows as a 
corollary, since God's language is both public and uni­
versal.
The multiplicity of human languages and culture 
patterns seems to give credence to philosophical relativism, 
The signs by which communal groups mark their ideas seem 
to be totally arbitrary. However, in one of his most in­
teresting arguments Berkeley shows that underlying the 
apparently arbitrary sounds and scribbles that man chooses 
to mark his ideas is an order imposed by the ontological 
factor. In a carefully developed analysis, Berkeley makes 
this point by showing that the data perceived by the five 
senses differ. In the case of a cube of any given color, 
we receive a type of visual datum. Upon touching and trac­
ing the outline of the cube tactually, we have a second 
type of sense datum. Normally, one would say that either 
type of sense datum is an adequate sign for conveying the 
information cube. ¥ e think that there is a necessary cor­
relation between tactile and visual signs. However, 
experiments with persons who gain sight after prior blind­
ness show that a person who is able to give the appropriate 
verbal sign cube to the touched object is unable to name 
the object from visual data alone. He cannot distinguish 
visually between a cube and a sphere, for example.
2 1
The data of all the senses, then, are signs given 
the perceiver directly by God. Each of the types of signs, 
in most respects, is quite unlike the other types; the 
visual datum cube differs from the tactile datum cube.
The connection between the two is, as far as the human 
perceiver knows, entirely arbitrary, and must be learned 
by experience. However, it is a matter of common exper­
ience that the visual and tactile data signifying cube are 
always found in conjunction, so the two are marked, in any 
human symbolic system, by one sign. This type of order 
does occur in any possible language because of the nature 
of the sensible sign-communication system which God has 
established with man.
Not only do ideas stand as signs in God's communi­
cation with man, but they instruct man how to regulate his 
actions in the "transactions and concerns of life." Berke­
ley is introducing indirectly his operational concept of 
the nature of any symbolic system. This concept is ampli­
fied in his discussion of distance perception and made 
fully explicit in his philosophy of science. It is through 
the universal language of the author of nature that we are 
instructed how to regulate our actions for our preservation 
and suit them to our purposes. Experience teaches us what 
rules we are to follow. As a simple example, let us con­
sider an infant just able to focus its eyes on a brightly 
colored toy suspended above its crib. At first it is
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probable that an infant must learn by experience to dis­
tinguish between its body and other bodies. The child 
reaches toward the toy gropingly at first, and wide of the 
mark. With experience, the infant learns how to order its 
actions and its body so that the toy can be grasped. Dis­
tance, for Berkeley, is not an absolute. It is not an idea 
and it is not a given. Distance is a type of relation— a 
relation involved in operational concepts. Distance is 
involved in what the infant must do to graSp the toy. Ex­
perience, and correlatively, training are necessary fac­
tors in learning to read God's language, just as they are 
a necessary factor in learning the use of human language.
Wittgenstein's doctrine of facts and objects pro­
vides the ontological foundation for his theory of signs 
upon which is based his picture-model theory of language. 
His rejection of the picture-model in the Investigations 
does not include an explicit rejection of his doctrine of 
objects as the ontological basis of signs and symbols. He 
writes:
. . . In our notations there is indeed something 
arbitrary, but this is not arbitrary, namely 
that we have determined anything arbitrarily, 
then something else must be the case. (This 
results from the essence of the notation.)3
Wittgenstein does not clarify the meaning of the 
phrase "essence of notation." This could be interpreted
3T, 3.342.
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in a Platonic sense but it is doubtful that one could sus­
tain such an interpretation without qualification. It 
could also mean something like this: When I commit myself
to the association of certain words with certain objects,
I also commit myself to a whole nexus of logical (but 
ontologically based) relationships. Wittgenstein writes, 
"The postulate of the possibility of the simple signs is 
the postulate of the determinateness of the sense.
Turning from a consideration of signs as marks of 
the ontic elements in experience, to signs and their hu­
man use, we shall follow Berkeley’s further analysis. He 
notes that all of the senses function as receptors, and 
all of the perceived data function as signs.
. . . But it is as certain that all signs are 
not language: not even all significant sounds,
such as the natural cries of animals, or the 
inarticulate sounds and interjections of men.
It is the articulation, combination, variety, 
copiousness, extensive and general use and 
easy application of signs that constitute the 
true nature of language.5
Not all signs constitute a language, or are included in a
language. Language involves signs as the basic element,
but also involves a set of rules, a grammar, an order.
Further :
Words (by them meaning all sorts of signs) 
are so necessary that instead of being (when 
duly used or in their own nature) prejudical 
to the advancement of knowledge, or an
^T, 3.23. ^Alc., 4th d., p. 157.
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hindrance to knowledge, that without them 
there could in mathematics he no demonstra­
tion.6
Berkeley cautions his reader to avoid the improper 
application and interpretation of words used as signs, as 
misunderstandings in this area lead to atheism, scepticism, 
and metaphysical confusion. However, he takes pains to 
reassure us that words are absolutely necessary to the ad­
vancement of knowledge. Even in mathematical reasoning or 
demonstration words are necessary. He remarks that we 
must avoid confusing the sign and the thing signified, be­
cause in the obvious sense the written or spoken charac­
ters are totally unlike the thing signified. However, the 
written characters must picture variation in the sound.
It is indeed arbitrary that, in general, let­
ters of any language represent sounds at all:
But when that is once agreed, it is not arbi­
trary what combination of letters shall repre­
sent this or that particular sound.7 (Cf. n.
3, supra p. 18.)
General rules, as we have seen, are neces­
sary to make the world intelligible.®
Whereas the natural connections of signs with the 
signified (patterns of ideas stemming from God) are regular 
and constant, the signification of ideas by words, depend­
ing on human convention with its element of arbitrariness, 
is liable to misinterpretation and ambituity. The simplest 
use of a word as sign is that of naming. A specific word
6 PC, 7 5 0 .  '^ NTV, s e c .  143 .  . ®S, s e c .  256 .
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can signify a simple sense quality, e.g., blue represents 
the color blue. Further, a word can signify fixed or 
stable patterns of sense data, as we have seen, such as 
chair, tree, table. Any isolable idea can be given a 
name. Our mistake, claims Berkeley, is to believe that 
every name must signify an idea. Where "I” stands for 
idea, "N” stands for name, and "R" stands for relation 
of naming; the truth of (x) (ixa/j^y ) (Ny • yRx^^ does not 
imply (y) ^Nya /T3x) (ix • yRxJ^ . Assuming that it does 
has led men into absurdities such as the assertion of the 
existence of material substance, a postulate which is the 
basis of the aforementioned philosophical errors.
Berkeley considers a third way in which signs enter 
into human experience.
Ideas which are observed to be connected with 
other ideas come to be considered as signs, by 
means whereof things not actually perceived by 
sense are signified or suggested to the imagi­
nation, whose objects they are, and which alone 
perceives them. As sounds suggest other things, 
so characters suggest those sounds, and, in 
general, all signs suggest the things signified, 
there being no idea which may not offer to the 
mind another idea which hath been frequently 
joined with it. In certain cases a sign may 
suggest its correlate as an effect, in others 
as a cause.9
In concrete instances of the above situations, we must note 
that there is no relation of similitude or causality given. 
There is no necessary connection. The perceiver develops
^TVV, sec. 39.
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the habit of expectation of the conjunction of event or 
idea "A” with event or idea "B" if they have been regularly 
observed to occur together. Ve may call "B" the effect, 
cause, or image of ”A " , but the basis for this is a psy­
chological one. It is not something given in experience.
In Berkeley’s words, "The connexion of ideas does not im­
ply the relation of cause and effect, but only of a mark 
or sign with the thing s i g n i f i e d .
Next, Berkeley discusses one of the most serious 
errors resulting from the misunderstanding of the language 
model and the nature of signs. Names which do not mark 
particular ideas are nonetheless significant, so men have 
been misled and have concluded that these names must stand 
for abstract ideas. Then, if these abstract ideas are sig­
nificant, they must have some sort of existence. It is 
this doctrine of abstract ideas which Berkeley is at pains 
to refute. One of his analogical arguments against the 
doctrine follows:
A little attention will discover that it is 
not necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) 
significant names which stand for ideas should, 
every time they are used, excite in the under­
standing the ideas they are made to stand for.1%
Names need not have one precise and settled significa­
tion for:
There is in truth an homonymy or diversity 
of significations in every name whatsoever
10PHK, sec. 65. UpHK, Introduction, sec. 19.
except only the proper names. Nor is there 
any such thing as a precise and definite sig- 
infication annexed to each name.12
Berkeley is not denying that there are general 
names. These are essential to human purpose. Ve do es­
tablish definitions for our terras, but keeping .a defini­
tion constant is a different matter from saying that a 
general name must always stand for or mark the same idea. 
If we attempted to do this, we would become trapped in 
private language and intelligible communication would not 
be possible.
One final example of Berkeley's analogical reason­
ing from the language-model illustrates the strong prag­
matic or instrumentalist bias in his thinking.
Words, it is agreed, are signs: it may not
therefore be amiss to examine the use of other 
signs, in order to know that of words. Count­
ers, for instance, at a card-table are used, 
not for their own sake, but only as signs sub­
stituted for money as words are for ideas, . . .
Is it necessary everytime these counters are 
used throughout the progress of a game, to 
frame an idea of the distinct sum or value 
that each represents? . . . Prom hence it 
seems to follow, that words may not be signi­
ficant, although they should not every time 
they are used, excite the ideas they signify 
in our minds; it being sufficient that we have 
it in our power to substitute things or ideas 
for their signs when there is occasion.13
For Berkeley, words used as signs have a "cash-value."
They serve as a convenient shorthand way of meeting our
human purposes. When it is convenient or necessary we can
12
PHK, Introduction to first draft, sec. 18.
l^Alc., 7th d ., sec. 5.
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oash them in for ideas or experience, but much of the time 
it is sufficient to operate with the signs or marks. Mach, 
in developing his empirio-pragmatism, acknowledges his debt 
to B e r k e l e y . O t h e r  members of the Vienna circle have 
acknowledged a debt to Wittgenstein for his formulation 
of this same v i e w . 15
Berkeley does not make a distinction between sign 
and symbol. In fact, he does not use the terra symbol.
The distinction between the terms is a fairly recent one. 
The two terms have different, but related, meanings for 
Wittgenstein. He explains this difference by noting, "A 
sign is what can be perceived of a symbol."1® "The sign 
is the part of the symbol perceptible by the senses."!?
The simple signs which are employed in propositions 
are called names, and the name means the object. Wittgen­
stein feels that a name cannot be analyzed further by any 
definition. It is a primitive sign. A sign which can be 
defined, a non-primitive sign, is signified by those signs 
which define it, and the definitions show how this is the 
case. Two signs, one of which is primitive and the other
l^Carlton Berenda (Weinberg), Mach's Empirio- 
Pragmatism in Physical Science. (New York: Albee Press,
1937), pp.
Arne Naess, Four Modern Philosophers, trans. by 
Alastair Hannay (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1968), p. 114.
^^T, 3.32 (Pears & McGuiness tr.)
1?T, 3.32.
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not, cannot signify in the same way. It is important to 
note that names cannot he taken to pieces by definition, 
nor can any sign which alone and independently refers to 
an object.
In the above development of the explanation of signs, 
it is clear that the object is, so to speak, the end of 
the lino. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein's logic and on­
tology coalesce. So far, his remarks appear to be in ac­
cord with Berkeley's views. The difference in modus 
operandi is that Wittgenstein omits the psychological evi­
dence for his position. Psychological evidence plays a 
key role in the development of Berkeley's view. The re­
sults of their analysis are quite similar, nonetheless.
Every part of a proposition which charac­
terizes its sense I call an expression (a sym­
bol). (The proposition itself is an expres­
sion. ) Expressions are everything— essential 
for the sense of the proposition— that propo­
sitions can have in common with one another.
An expression characterizes a form and a con­
tent.18
Signs and symbols have different logical properties. As 
Wittgenstein explains in a later period of his career:
"Every sign ^  itself seems dead. What gives it life? In 
use it is alive. Is life breathed into it there? Or is 
the use its life?"l®
Symbols, by definition, are alive. They express.
The symbolic activity characterizes a form and a content.
^®T, 3.31. 432.
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Objects, their marks or signs, and the relations obtaining 
among them are the elements of form and content. It is 
often the case that different symbols have written or au­
dible signs in common. But if they are different symbols 
they signify in different ways. The most fundamental con­
fusions of philosophy arise from the fact that in common 
usage the same word signifies in different ways and belongs 
to different symbols, or that two words which signify in 
different ways are applied in the same way. This account 
is in accord with Berkeley's views.
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein's position is that:
In order to avoid such errors we must make use 
of a sign language that excludes them by not 
using the same sign for different symbols and 
by not using in a superficially similar way 
signs that have different modes of significa­
tion: that is to say, a sign-language that is
governed by logical grammar, by logical syntax.^0
In the early stages of his philosophical develop­
ment, Wittgenstein advocates reform of language. He seems 
to feel that an ideal language is possible, desirable and 
even necessary. Berkeley does not make this proposal.
From the beginning of his philosophical meditations, 
Berkeley is aware of the enormous complexity of language 
and the multiplicity of its uses. Berkeley is familiar 
with the work of Leibniz, and apparently does not chose to 
develop, or even comment on, the latter's conception of 
the possibility of a universal symbolic language.
20,T, 3,325 (Pears & McGuiness tr.).
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Wittgenstein's insights into the enormous complexity of 
Janguage come later in life. They are the basis of his 
abandonment of the picture theory as well as his rather 
rigid notions of what an adequate language could and should 
do.
Wittgenstein continues his exposition of the nature 
and relations of signs and symbols by remarking that we 
must consider the significant use if we are to recognize 
the symbol in the sign. A sign alone is incapable of de­
termining logical form. This is shown only by the sign 
together with its logical-syntactical application. There 
is no such thing as a non-referring sign. If a sign is 
not necessary, not used in context, it has no meaning.
Yet the meaning of a sign ought not to play a role in the 
logical syntax itself.
Wittgenstein discusses the relationship between 
signs and thought:
In a proposition a thought finds an expres­
sion that can be perceived by the senses. . . .
We use the perceptible sign of a proposition 
(spoken or written, etc.) as a projection of a 
possible situation.21
The above view is an introduction to the picture theory of 
language. Wittgenstein distinguishes between a preposi­
tional sign (another use of the terra sign) and a proposi­
tion. The elements of the prepositional sign are words
^^T, 3.1 and 3.11 (Pears & McGuiness tr.).
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which are combined in a definite way. The prepositional 
sign is a fact. Wittgenstein is making the assertion that 
the prepositional sign is the link between being and know­
ing, between ontology and epistemology. He remarks that,
Only facts can express a sense, a class of 
names cannot. . . . That the prepositional 
sign is a fact is concealed by the ordinary 
form of expression, written or printed. (For 
in the printed proposition, for example, the 
sign of a proposition does not appear essen­
tially different from a word.)^^
Objects are the ontological building blocks of ex­
perience. Names mark them, or mean them. Classes of names 
express nothing. Names as parts of facts are shown in var­
ious relations, in the context of a grammar. Thus facts 
or propositional signs can express a sense, and the expres­
sion of that sense is what is called a proposition. The 
fact is the possibility of expression. The expression or 
proposition asserts the fact. Therefore, as Wittgenstein 
says, the proposition is not a mere mixture of words, but 
is articulate. He notes:
The essential nature of the prepositional sign 
becomes very clear when we imagine it made up 
of spatial objects (such as chairs, tables, 
books,) instead of written signs. The mutual 
spatial position of these things then expresses 
the sense of the proposition.23
It follows that states of affairs, or what is the case, can
be described by propositions but not named. Names are
signs, and they are similar to points and mean objects.
22 2
T, 3.142 and 3.143. ^^T, 3.1431.
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Symbols are signs put to use in relational contexts as 
determined by the rules of grammar or logic. The signs, 
the rules of relation, and their use together constitute 
a language.
Both Berkeley and Wittgenstein regard signs as marks 
of sense experience, and these marks are the foundation of 
knowledge. Both claim that the signs are not in any sense 
copies of that which is signified. Berkeley claims that 
his doctrine serves to refute atheism, scepticism, and 
relativism. Signs, for both philosophers, have instru­
mental value. Wittgenstein omits the theological and psy­
chological aspects of Berkeley's analysis of signS. The 
distinction between sign and symbol is Wittgenstein's most 
notable contribution to the theory of signs. Both men con­
sider an understanding of the nature, uses and functions 
of signs essential to an understanding of the nature of 
language.
CHAPTER IV
LANGUAGE AND METAPHYSICAL PUZZLES
Both Berkeley and Wittgenstein turn attention to 
the language model itself in order to clear up and dispel 
these metaphysical puzzles which, both claim, arise from 
a misunderstanding of the language. Language analysis is 
the primary methodological procedure for both philosophers. 
Berkeley outlines his theory of language in his early note­
books, and he develops and refines this theory consistently 
throughout his lifetime. Wittgenstein presents two lan­
guage theories, or more accurately, two language models.
The picture-model theory expounded in the Tractatus is 
superseded by the language game-model which forms the core 
of the Philosophical Investigations. Although some com­
mentators assert that there is a radical dichotomy between 
these two theories, it is my opinion that the picture- 
model is a legitimate instance of one of the multiplicity 
of actual and possible language games. In his early work, 
therefore, Wittgenstein mistakes a valid and useful part 
of the overall theory for the whole of the description of 
the nature and functions of language.
That language has multiple uses and functions is 
the crux of Berkeley's language theory. It is also a key 
concept in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.
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Specifically, Berkeley notes;
The communicating of ideas marked by words is 
not the chief and only end of language, as is 
commonly supposed. There are other ends, as 
the raising of some passion, the exciting to, 
or deterring from an action, the putting the 
mind in some particular disposition; to which 
the former is in many cases barely subservient, 
and sometimes entirely ommitted, when these 
can be obtained without it, as I think doth 
not infrequently happen in the familiar use 
of language.!
Berkeley makes the point well that much, if not 
most, of our discourse is non-cognitive. Language serves 
many purposes, not least among which is the exhorting the 
listener to some attitude or emotion which is unrelated to 
cognitive matters. Confusion of fact and attitude, or 
fact and emotion, is a common source of philosophical puz­
zlement. Berkeley writes further:
I entreat the reader to reflect with himself, 
and see if it doth not often happen whether 
in hearing or reading a discourse, that the 
passions of fear, love, hatred, admiration, 
disdain, and the like arise, immediately in 
his mind upon the perception of certain words, 
without any ideas coming between.2
Berkeley also points out that language is used as a
principle of economy in reasoning.
Names are for the most part used as letters 
are in algebra, in which though a particular 
quantity be marked by each letter, yet to pro­
ceed right it is not requisite that in every 
step each letter suggest to your thoughts, that 
particular quantity it was appointed to stand 
for.3
!pHK, Introduction, sec. 20. ^Ibid.
^PHK, Introduction, sec. 19.
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111 such cases words, letters, or other symbols are used 
as shorthand devices to replace both experience and 
thought.
Berkeley is also aware of the fact that proper
names often have more than one signification and that they
are not necessarily used to refer. They are often used to
put the mind in some particular disposition, and here the
cognitive use is subservient.
For example, when a Schoolman tells me Aristotle 
hath said it, all I conceive he means by it, is 
to disposé me to embrace his opinion with the 
deference and submission which custom has annexed 
to that name.4
Throughout his writing Berkeley makes an appeal to 
and gives examples of the way words and expressions are 
actually used. He does not look for essential meanings 
based on universal essences, but looks, rather, to ordi­
nary usage. He is not striving for an ideal or perfect 
language, nor does he call for the correction of the pre­
sent one. He is using the paradigm-case argument tech­
nique. Indeed, he believes that tampering with ordinary 
language is not only impracticable, but impossible.
In the ordinary affairs of life, any phrases 
may be retained so long as they excite in us 
proper sentiments, or dispositions to act in 
such a manner as is necessary for our well­
being, how false soever they may be if taken 
in a strict and speculative sense. . . it is
4PHK, Introduction, sec. 20.
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impossible, even in the most rigid philosophic 
reasonings so far to alter the bent and genius 
of the tongue we speak.5
Berkeley cautions his reader to be aware of the 
scope, tenor, and purpose of the discourse, to make allow­
ances for the metaphorical use of language. He will then 
avoid falling into the error of being deluded by words or 
language. A serious consideration of the doctrine of 
signs will show us that the primary purpose and use of 
language is:
. . . Directing our actions in pursuit of that 
happiness which is the ultimate end and design, 
the primary spring and motive, that sets rational 
agents at work: that signs may imply or sug­
gest the relations of things; cannot be by us 
understood but by the help of signs, so being 
thereby expressed and confuted, they direct and 
enable us to act with regard to things: that
the true end of speech, reason, science, faith, 
assent in all its different degrees, is not 
merely, or principally, or always, the imparting 
or acquiring of ideas, but rather something of 
an active operative nature, tending to a con­
ceived good: which may sometimes be obtained,
not only although the ideas marked are not of­
fered to the mind, but even although there 
should be no possibility of offering or exhi­
biting any such idea to the mind.®
Thus, language is affirmed to be an activity. It 
is also asserted to be first and foremost an instrumental 
activity, the purpose of which is not to obtain that elu­
sive commodity truth but rather to enable man to achieve 
the good life. Finally, in Berkeley’s general comments on 
language, he expresses his belief that there are things 
that cannot be said.
^PHK, sec. 52. ®Alc., 7th d ., p. 307.
The impossibility oX defining or discoursing 
clearly of most things proceeds iiom the fault 
and scantiness of language, as much, perhaps, 
as from the obscurity and confusion of thought.
*  * *
We know many things which we want words to 
express. Great things discoverable upon this 
principle, for want of considering which divers 
men have run into sundry mistakes endeavouring 
to set forth their knowledge by sounds, which 
foundering them, they thought the defect was 
in their knowledge when in truth it was in 
their language.?
Berkeley divides the content of human knowledge 
into three general categories: ideas, relations, and
spirits. These are on different levels, as it were. We 
can speak cognitively of ideas in ordinary subject-predicate 
language. We handle the problems of relations by arbi­
trarily devising rules of formation and transformation 
which are checked for adequacy by application to states of 
affairs, and which are evaluated according to utility; and 
finally of spirits, minds, or selves, we can speak only 
metaphorically. If we try to apply the criteria of cog­
nitive language to those areas where they do not and can­
not apply, we commit philosophical error. This, I believe, 
is essentially Wittgenstein's mature position. Each lan­
guage game must be put to an appropriate use for that game. 
So, as Berkeley suggests above, when we seek for an idea 
where it is impossible in principle that there could be 
one, and when we try to mark a non-existent.idea by a
?PC, 178 and 233.
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significant term, we attribute the ensuing muddle to the 
frailty of human knowledge, when, in truth, language by 
its very nature is inadequate to cope with the situation 
in a strict cognitive manner. Berkeley does not, however, 
deny the value of metaphor and analogy in the attempted 
explication of that which is, in the strict sense, unsay- 
able .
Berkeley's positive doctrine in his overall view of 
language is a theory of cognitive discourse. It is ob­
vious from the foregoing discussion that it is not meant 
to apply to all possible discourse. This positive doctrine 
could serve as a precise model for Wittgenstein's picture 
theory of language.
Berkeley claims that each of the senses has its pro­
per type of object, which is immediately given in percep­
tion. There are no necessary connections among the ob­
jects appropriate to the different senses, nor are these 
objects alike in kind, except that they are all both given 
and received as ideas. For example, colors are appropriate 
objects for the sense of sight, as are shapes. Extension, 
texture and hardness are the objects of touch, and sounds, 
i.e., tones, pitch, etc. are the objects of the sense of 
hearing. Given normal sensibilities, the perceiver grasps 
the objects as given— immediately given. No act of will 
or act of interpretation is involved. The visible, tan­
gible, and audible sensations are what they are. According
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to Berkeley, these immediate objects of perception are 
explicable as signs of the language of the author of na­
ture, or God. These simple sense data are the universal, 
public aspect of experience. They are per se non- 
interpretive.
Congeries of simple sensa are the ordinary ideas to 
which we give names. The signs or names by which we mark 
them are arbitrary, with the reservations noted in Chapter 
II. Ideas are the referents of the signs which signify 
directly. These signs are the proper nouns, substantives, 
or names, e.g., Joe Jones, table, larva. Interpretation 
is involved here. We might, for example, interpret a com­
plex set of sense data as Joe Jones, but upon closer exam­
ination find that that particular set of data is George 
Gonzales sense data. We learn to recognize Joe jones data 
initially from experience and training. As children—  
infants, in fact,— we are trained in the performance of 
the activity that is the language game of our particular 
culture. It is, indeed, a form of life.
Philosophical error is involved, according to 
Berkeley, when we seek for something behind, beneath, or 
beyond our table data or our larva data. There is nothing 
beyond or beneath in any material sense. All is there in 
plain view. Any search for material substrate or substance 
which supports the simple perceptual objects is vain. 
Berkeley claims that all philosophers would agree that we
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know our ideas directly. But, he claims, other than ideas 
which we do perceive directly, we have no immediate know­
ledge. Berkeley does, however, uphold, the validity of 
inferences to other minds, and God's divine sensible lan­
guage is the guarantee that there is an objective, public, 
and universal aspect to our ideas. Berkeley's refutation 
of mind-raatter dualism, he feels, solves the knowledge 
problem and eliminates scepticism. He writes, "Vain is 
the distinction twixt intellectual and material world."®
The objects of mediate perception which do involve 
an act of judgment are related to the immediate perceptions 
according to rules. Cognitive language, which is the con­
crete expression of the rules, or grammar, or logic of the 
language, is the outcome of training. It is learned by 
trial and error, by experience. The patterns of order ob­
taining in the divine sensible language are learned by u s , 
and we gropingly attempt to act in accordance with those 
rules. We cannot discern necessity in the rules; hence we 
must, both as individuals and as communities, learn them 
through training and experience. There is no necessity in 
the fact that fire burns, that water quenches thirst while 
turpentine kills, etc. We can describe, through observa­
tion and experience, the ways in which simple sensa are 
connected, but we cannot deduce these relationships. When 
we learn, by experience and observation, the workings of
®PC, 538.
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one! system of patterns, w(! can, occasionally, by analogy 
use the method of deduction to predict elements in siinilaj- 
patterns, but we find no necessity here. We can assign 
rules of formation and transformation to various sets of 
symbols, and then, upon occasion, find appropriate areas 
of experience to which these sets can be applied; but the 
only necessity is that we obey the arbitrarily chosen 
fundamental rules of the system of signs within the con­
text of which we are operating.
A great number of arbitrary signs, various 
and apposite, do constitute a language. If 
such arbitrary connexion be instituted by men, 
it is an artificial language; if by the Author 
of nature, it is a natural language. . . .  A 
connexion established by the Author of nature, 
in the ordinary course of things, may surely 
be called natural; as that made by men will 
be named artificial. And yet this doth not 
hinder but the one may be as arbitrary as the
other.9
The signification given by divine sensible language 
points to the actions a perceiver must perform in order to 
experience the associated objects. Contemporary develop­
ments of this view are called pragmatism, instrumentalism, 
and operationalism. The meaning of any language or sym­
bolic system is a function of its use.
Although the topic and correlative problems of the 
subject pole of experience, the "1" pole, will be developed 
in Chapter V l l , a brief statement of Berkeley's view will 
help clarify his theory of language. He writes:
®TVV, sec. 40.
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To ino it soems that idoas, splrii.s, and re­
lations are all in their respective kinds, tlu; 
object of human knowledge and subject of dis­
course: and that the term idea would be im­
properly extended to signify everything we 
know or have any notion of.10
Mind is a congeries of perceptions. Take 
away the perceptions and you take away the 
mind. Put the perceptions and you put the 
mind .
* *  *
Say you the mind is not the perception, but 
that thing which perceives. I answer you are 
abused by the words that and thing. These are
vague and empty words without a meaning.H
Hence, the form of language employed should be 
adapted to the respective type of discourse. Cognitive 
language is to be applied to discourse about ideas. Rela­
tions refer to mental activity. The mind recognizes stable
patterns and sequences and describes them in terras of re­
lations. Relational language consists of arbitrarily in­
vented symbolic systems such as those of logic and mathe­
matics, which can be applied, when relevant, to the 
experiential sequences. Finally, mentalistic language is 
metaphorical or analogical. Berkeley concludes that the 
limits of the intelligible world are the limit's of cogni­
tive discourse, and we must keep in mind the distinction 
among cognitive, relational, and metaphorical forms.
Wittgenstein develops his theory of language in two 
distinct phases. The first, the picture-model theory, is
sec. 89. ^^PC, 580 and 581.
44
presented in the Tractatus. The second phase, the language- 
game theory, is described in the Philosophical Investiga­
tions . The picture-model theory is comparable in scope to 
that element in Berkeley's discussion of language which we 
have called his theory of cognitive language. This is the 
aspect of language which is appropriate to scientific in­
vestigation and research. Significant terras are dependent 
upon and mark either simple sense data or clusters of sense 
data. Assertions about matters of fact which can be 
checked against experience, and which can, in principle, 
be determined to be either true or false, comprise mean­
ingful discourse. ¥e shall investigate Wittgenstein's 
picture-model theory first.
The picture-model differs from Berkeley's theory of 
cognitive language in several ways. Wittgenstein is much 
more concerned with the technical aspects of the logic of 
language than Berkeley. It is difficult to separate, even 
in principle, Wittgenstein's language theory from his logic, 
but we shall attempt a conceptual distinction for exposi­
tory purposes.
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein uses the terms 
thought and language synonomously. He develops his 
picture-model before he mentions the term language. It 
will be helpful, to recall Wittgenstein's remarks about the 
nature and function of philosophy.
l^T, 3.2, 3.202, 4.001.
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The object of philosophy is the logical 
clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not 
a theory but an activity. A philosophical 
work consists essentially of elucidations. The 
result of philosophy is not a number of "philo­
sophical propositions," but to make proposi­
tions clear. Philosophy should make clear and 
delimit sharply the thoughts which otherwise 
are, as it were, opaque and blurred.
In the light of the above quotation, the utility 
of the picture-model can be seen. We might liken the pro­
positions of meaningful discourse to a photographic print 
of reality. The philosopher functions as a trained photo­
grapher who understands how to focus the "camera" of under­
standing, how to develop the negatives (sense data) pro­
perly, and how to interpret the prints (language) adequately 
If we attempt to substitute a poor, distorted or fake print 
or picture for reality, we run into difficulties. The 
philosopher's role is to show men how to bring the lenses 
of understanding into sharp focus, and how to read the 
prints. If we can learn to do all this, we shall not be 
led astray. We shall no longer talk nonsense, or ask 
nonsensical questions.
Wittgenstein introduces the picture-model in these 
passages from the Tractatus.
(1) "The total reality is the world."14
(2 ) "We make to ourselves pictures of facts."15
(3) "The picture is a model of reality."16
I3r, 4.112. I'^ T, 2.063. ^^T, 2.1.
1®T, 2.12.
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(4) "To the objects correspond in the picture the 
elements of the picture."1?
(5) "The elements of the picture stand, in the 
picture, for the objects.
(6) "The picture consists in the fact that its 
elements are combined with one another in a definite way."^^
(?) "The picture is a fact. "20 
It is also useful to keep in mind that Wittgenstein feels 
that a psychological analysis is completely irrelevant to 
his central problem.
Psychology is no nearer related to philo­
sophy, than is any other natural science. The 
theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psy­
chology. Does not my study of sign-language 
correspond to the study of thought processes 
which philosophers held to be so essential to 
the philosophy of logic? Only they got en­
tangled for the most part in unessential psy­
chological investigations, and there is an 
analogous danger for ray method.21
Ontological and epistemological questions are mean­
ingless according to Wittgenstein's theory of language, and 
psychological questions are irrelevant. It is probable 
that Wittgenstein would criticize Berkeley for attempting 
to remark on all three. However, we do find all three 
types of statements in Wittgenstein's philosophy, either 
explicitly stated or implied.
I'^ T, 2.13. 2.131.
19,
21
l^T, 2.141. Z^T, 4.1121.
T, 4.1121
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In the seven numbered statements above, Wittgen­
stein sets up his analogy quite clearly. From them we can 
draw the conclusion that the totality of true pictures 
comprises the totality of the picture of reality. Reality 
consists of combinations of objects. These clusters of 
objects, Wittgenstein terras facts. Facts are groups of 
objects which are intelligible, or can be thought. There 
are simple facts and complex facts. The latter can be re­
solved into the former. The elements of the picture stand, 
in the picture, for the objects. The elements would be the 
atomic facts. The elements of the picture are combined in 
a definite, coherent way because the objects are so com­
bined. Therefore, the picture theory does presuppose an 
ontology. Since the picture is a fact, it is the business 
of the philosopher to show how the fact that is the picture 
refers to the facts which are the elements of the picture, 
and how the elements of the picture stand for the objects. 
The internal relations of the elements of the picture de­
termine the arrangement of the signs which are thought or 
expressed.
(s) That the elements of the picture are combined 
with one another in a definite way, represents 
that the things are so combined with one another. 
This connexion of the elements of the picture 
is called its structure, and the possibility 
of this structure is called the form of repre­
sentation of the picture.22
22
T, 2.15.
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(9 ) The form of representation is the possibility 
that things are combined with one another as 
are the elements of the picture.23
Statements (8) and (9) show the ontological basis 
of Wittgenstein's picture-model theory quite clearly. 
Statement (S) reiterates the position that things are com­
bined with one another in a definite way. The world is 
ordered and coherent. Wittgenstein makes no comment about 
the origin of the order of the world as given, but does 
state, "The world is independent of my will."24
The pictures that we make to ourselves of the world
have a definite structure. The possibility of the struc­
ture is called the form of the representation. The form 
of representation is a key concept in Wittgenstein's pre­
sentation because this form also states the possibility 
that things are combined with one another as are the ele­
ments of the picture.
(10) "It /The picture/ is like a scale applied to 
reality.
(11) "Only the outermost points of the dividing 
lines touch the object to be m e a s u r e d . "26
(12) "According to his view the representing re­
lation which makes it a picture, also belongs to the pic­
ture .
2%r, 2.151. ^^T, 6.373. ^^T, 2.1512.
^®T, 2.15121. ^"^ T, 2.1513.
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(13) "The representing relation consists of the 
coordination of the elements of the picture and the 
things."28
(14) "These coordinations are as it were the feel­
ers of its elements with which the picture touches real­
ity . "29
(15) "In order to be a picture a fact must have 
something in common with what it pictures,"20
(16) "In the picture and the pictured there must 
be something identical in order that the one can be a 
picture of the other at all."21
(it) "What the picture must have in common with 
reality in order to be able to represent it after its 
manner— rightly or falsely— is its form of representa­
tion. "22
The bridge between thought and reality, the common 
ground, the solution to the problem which has bemused gen­
erations of philosophers, Wittgenstein claims to have 
found in the doctrine of logical form. This seems to be 
both an ontological and epistemological claim. Logical 
form shows itself in thought, and in thought expressed, 
which is language. Nothing can be said about logical form, 
as it is already presupposed in any meta-language. This 
is the rationale for analogical reasoning.
28T, 2.1514. 29t , 2.1515. 20^^ 2.16.
21t, 2.161. 22^, 2.17.
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In Berkeley's philosophy the sensible language of 
the author of nature is subject to human interpretation, 
is the legitimate ground for all cognitive discourse, and 
may be considered a guide to conduct for the preservation 
and well-being of mankind. Berkeley's arguments for this 
view have been presented. In Wittgenstein's case there 
are logical forms common to language and reality. God's 
divine sensible language and the logical forms play com­
parable ontological roles respectively in the philosophies 
of Berkeley and Wittgenstein. Just as Berkeley points out 
that a finite mind cannot, in principle, detect necessity 
in the sensual patterns by means of which God communicates 
with man, so Wittgenstein claims human reason cannot trans­
cend the limits of the language to talk about the logical 
form of language. One cannot speak of the world from an 
extra-terrestrial perspective. The limits of the language 
are the limits of the world.
The doctrine of logical form is the pivotal concept 
in the picture-model theory of language. Wittgenstein 
claims that we cannot say how the picture represents the 
facts, but this representation shows itself in the picture. 
The form of representation makes itself manifest. Two 
analogies are helpful here. We might consider the picture 
as a map of reality. The pattern of the elements of the 
picture are a projection of the intelligible groupings of 
objects, which are the facts. Points ABCD, so arranged in
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the picture, are a projection of the objects ordered as 
facts. We might consider ourselves as spreading the map, 
the picture, on a coffee table, and pointing out the var­
ious relevant features. "See, here is Truchas. Here is 
Cordova. The scale is one inch to one mile. Cordova and 
Truchas are two miles apart. These curved lines are ele­
vation lines. Cordova is in the valley five hundred feet 
below Truchas." One can point to this feature and that 
feature. One learns to read a map. The analogy between 
the map and the picture cannot really be explained, but 
only shown ostensively. Wittgenstein poses the question, 
"How do we learn to read the map?" but he fails to give an 
answer. His view is that this is a psychological question, 
not a logical one.
A second analogy which is helpful is the comparison 
of the logical picture in logical space with pointer read­
ing. In a lie detector, for instance, a pen marks a moving 
graph. What do the marks have in common with the state of 
affairs they are supposed to represent? The common element 
is a certain form. According to Wittgenstein, this form 
cannot be stated, but corresponding elements in the various 
states of affairs can be pointed out. We must understand 
the method of projection. The black marks on the graph . 
fluctuate when the pulse rate changes. We assume that the 
pulse rate pictures the state of excitement of the detectee, 
and that his excitement level, in turn, pictures the
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truth-value of the answers he gives his interrogator.
Here we are working with a triple picture analogy, each 
aspect of which has a certain form in common with all the 
others. We are not dealing with causal relationships here, 
but with states of affairs sharing a common logical form. 
The question may be asked, "Which is the picture, and 
which the reality?" The answer can only be, "Whichever 
suits our purpose." (This point is further developed in 
Wittgenstein's extended theory of language, the language- 
game model.) Wittgenstein does not give a clear answer to 
the question of how we learn the method of projection, and 
how we recognize the common logical form. Is this an in­
nate ability or a learned response? If the latter, how is 
it learned? Wittgenstein tells us only that
(18) "The picture represents a possible state of 
affairs in logical space."33
(19) "The picture contains the possibility of the 
state of affairs which it represents."34
(20) "The picture agrees with reality or not; it 
is right or wrong, true or false."35
(21) "The picture represents what it represents, 
independently of its truth or falsehood, through the form
of the representation."36
(22) "What the picture represents is its sense."37
33r, 2.02. 2.203. ^^T, 2.21.
^®T, 2.22. S^T, 2.221.
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(23) "In the agreement or disagreement of its 
sense with reality, its truth or falsity consists."^®
(24) "In order to discover whether the picture is 
true or false we must compare it with reality."39
(25) "It cannot he discovered from the picture 
alone whether it is true or false."^0
(26) "There is no picture which is a priori true."^!
(27) "The logical picture of the facts is the
thought."42
(28) "The totality of true thought is a picture of 
the world."43
(29) "The thought contains the possibility of the 
state of affairs which it thinks. What is thinkable is
also possible."44
In statement (29) above, Wittgenstein replaces the 
term picture by t,he term thought, and the further transi­
tion is made later from thought to language. The picture 
or thought or language (i.e., meaningful discourse) repre­
sents a possible state of affairs in logical space. We
must be careful not to extend our analogies too far. Any
definite state of affairs obtaining in logical space lends 
itself to symbolic representation, both by the sounds and
2 .222. 39^^ 2.223. 40^^ 2.224.
41t, 2.225. 42?, 3 , 43?^ 3.01.
44t , 3.02.
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marks of ordinary language, and also by the marks of formal 
symbolic logic. A definite state of affairs, represented 
in some fashion, divides logical space. A proposition 
representing that state of affairs does two things: "The
proposition shows how things stand, if it is true. And it 
says, that they do so stand.45
A true proposition divides logical space. If state 
of affairs "A" obtains, state of affairs "not-A" is ex­
cluded from the logical space occupied by A. Wittgenstein 
was extremely interested in giving an adequate account of 
the use of the term not. The relation of negation to truth 
is discussed in Chapter V. In order to give an adequate 
account of experience, we must deal with those pictures 
which do not agree with reality. If all pictures did 
agree with reality, because they each share a common logi­
cal form with facts, error would be not only inexplicable, 
it would be impossible. According to Wittgenstein, all 
pictures do represent possible states of affairs. The 
picture represents what it represents independently of its 
truth or falsehood, and it does this through the form of 
representation, according to (22) above. If both true and 
false propositions exhibit logical form, it follows that 
there are many more possible forms than actual forms. The 
facts are what is the case, and the world is the totality
45T, 4.022.
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of facts. Also, there is no necessity in what is the case 
The objects, although they hang together like links in a 
chain, are independent. The logical picture of the facts 
is the thought, and the thought contains the possibility 
of the state of affairs which it thinks. That which is 
thinkable is also possible. Wittgenstein avoids the ques­
tion of what brings the possible into the realm of the 
actual. He does say that there is no picture which is a 
priori true.
The proposition is a picture of reality.
The proposition is a model of the reality as 
we think it is.
* * *
At first glance the proposition— say as it 
stands printed on paper— does not seem to be 
a picture of the reality of which it treats.
But nor does the musical score appear at first 
sight to be a picture of a musical piece; nor
does our phonetic spelling (letters) seem to
be a picture of our spoken language.
* *  *
. . , There is a general rule by which the 
musician can read the symphony out of the
score. . . . And the rule is the law of pro-
jection.
* *  ^
The possibility of all similes, of all the 
imagery of our language, rests on the logic of 
its representation.
■X- *  *
The proposition is a picture of reality, 
for I know the state of affairs presented by 
it, if I understand the proposition, without 
having its sense explained to me.
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Thf! proposition shows its sense.46
If it is the ease that propositions are pictures of 
reality because an understanding of a proposition leads to 
knowledge of states of affairs, then the question of how 
error is possible is raised again. Wittgenstein, as noted, 
hopes to avoid the whole realm of metaphysics and episte- 
mology. He deems it nonsense. Yet it is hard to see, in 
spite of his analogies, how we get from the picture to 
reality— that is, to the objects which the propositions 
represent in combination as states of affairs. He cannot, 
from his standpoint, attribute error to will, as this is a 
psychological explanation which he deems irrelevant, if 
not meaningless. At this juncture his theory sounds dual- 
istic. When Wittgenstein introduces the concept of logical 
forms as the common element in thought and reality, the 
dualism is surmounted in principle, but might not this solu­
tion be subject to Aristotle's classic third man objection?
Wittgenstein can and does resort to saying that he 
has shown that we cannot ask the question, since it is 
senseless. ,
The right method of philosophy would be 
this. To say nothing except what can be said, 
i.e. the propositions of natural science. . . 
and then always when someone else wished to 
say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to
^®T, 4.01, 4.011, 4.0141, 4.015, 4.021, and 4.022.
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him that he had given no meaning to certain 
signs in his propositions. This me(hod would 
be unsatisfying to the other— he would not 
have the feeling that we were teaching him 
philosophy— but it would be the only strictly 
correct method.47
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein leaves three explicit 
questions unanswered: (l) the ontological question about
the status of objects; (2 ) the epistemological question 
about logical form; and (3) the psychological question re­
garding the learning of the method of projection. Berkeley 
provides clear-cut answers to all three questions.
In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein repu­
diates the position he presented in the Tractatus insofar 
as that position was based on the idea that what can be 
said can be said clearly. His early intense interest in 
problems which lie at the foundation of logic and mathe­
matics apparently blinded him to the importance of that 
broad spectrum of discourse which is not amenable to rigor­
ous logical analysis. Wittgenstein uses the terra logic in 
a broad and a narrow sense. In the broad sense, logic 
refers to the underlying elements and patterns of all dis­
course, which elements and patterns make the transmission 
of meaning possible. This is the type of logic with which 
he is concerned in the Investigations. In the narrow 
sense, the term refers to the art of assigning and manipu­
lating symbols by means of which ambiguity and vagueness
47
T, 6.53.
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can be eliminated from discourse. It is this sense of 
logic which is predominant in the Tractatus. At first 
Wittgenstein feels that logic, in the narrow sense, is 
the foundation of all meaningful discourse. Those areas 
to which it does not apply are termed areas of nonsense or 
meaninglessness. In the Blue Book, however, he writes;
When we talk of language as a symbolism used 
in an exact calculus, that which is in our mind 
can be found in the sciences and in mathematics.
Our ordinary use of language conforms to this 
standard of exactness only in rare cases. Why 
then do we in philosophizing constantly compare 
our use of words with one following exact rules?
The answer is that the puzzles which we try to 
remove always spring from just this attitude 
towards language.48
The above view is very similar to Berkeley's con­
viction that men are drawn into error as long as they 
believe
The only immediate use of words was to signify 
ideas, and that the immediate signification of 
every general name was a determinate abstract 
idea. . . . But these being known to be mis­
takes, a man may with greater ease prevent his 
being imposed on by words. He that knows he 
has no other than particular ideas, will not 
puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive 
the abstract idea, annexed to any name. And 
he that knows names do not always stand for 
ideas will spare himself the labour of looking 
for ideas, where there are not to be had.^9
Berkeley has three primary insights into the nature 
of language. Wittgenstein comes to realize the importance
48m . pp. 25-26.
4^PHK, Introduction, sec. 23.24.
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of those only in his second jxM'iod o 1’ ph i I oKOjilri c;i. 1 jkî- 
tivity, and they form the bases oi his Philosophical 
Investigations. These insights are: (l) the enormous
complexity of language; (2) the instrumental nature of 
language; and (3) the active nature of language. Berkeley 
also gives a threefold list of benefits to be gained from 
arriving at an understanding of the true nature and func­
tion of language. These benefits are: (l) to get clear
of verbal controversy; (2 ) to get rid of abstractions and 
thus the mental discomfort arising from puzzlement; and 
(3) to avoid mistakes (i.e., if one confines his thoughts 
to his own ideas, he cannot be mistaken).
Neither Berkeley nor Wittgenstein purports to be 
making new discoveries or to be setting out new principles. 
They are both trying to "recall men from metaphysics to 
common sense." Wittgenstein's program and justification 
for his investigations pivot about the above three points. 
He suggests that the expression theory of language is, 
itself, inappropriate for his philosophical work because 
it leads us to think we can get beyond language and set up 
a framework or system in terms of which we can expose or 
arrive at the essence of language. In the first place, 
there is no essence of language, and in the second place, 
a meta-language is impossible in p r i n c i p l e . ^0 would
SOT, 3.332.
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have to assume the structure which we wish to investigate.
In this presentation we have used the expression language
thfior.v for expository purposes, but it should not be taken
literally. Wittgenstein insists:
We may not advance any kind of a theory. There 
must not be anything hypothetical in our con­
siderations. We must do away with all explana­
tion, and description alone must take its place.
And this description gets its light, that is to 
say its purpose, from the philosophical pro­
blems. These are, of course, not empirical 
problems; they are solved, rather, by looking 
into the workings of our language, and that in 
such a way as to make us recognize those work­
ings: despite of an urge to misunderstand
them. The problems are solved, not by giving 
new information, but by arranging what we have 
always known. Philosophy is a battle against 
the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of 
language.51
Berkeley's points (2) and (3) above are included 
here. When Berkeley refers to confining one's thoughts 
to his own ideas, he means we must look directly into the 
workings of language itself to find where we are tricked 
by it, rather than attempt to "search the heavens and pry 
into the entrails of the earth," for everything is before 
us and in plain sight.^2 Wittgenstein makes the point 
clear in another way:
(Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.5): "The
general form of propositions is: This is how
things are."— That is the kind of proposition 
that one repeats to oneself countless times.
51pi, 109.
^^PHK, Introduction, sec. 24.
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One thinks that one is tracing the outline 
of the thing's nature over and over again, and 
one is merely tracing round the frame through 
which we look at it.53
Berkeley urges us to draw aside the veil or curtain 
of words— stop tracing around the frame, as it were. Witt­
genstein's way of expressing the common conviction of the 
two men that verbal controversies "hinder the sciences" 
is as follows:
It is the business of philosophy, not to 
resolve a contradiction by means of a mathe­
matical or logico-matheraatical discovery, but 
to make it possible for us to get a clear view 
of the state of mathematics that troubles us: 
the state of affairs before the contradiction 
is resolved. . . . The fundamental fact here 
is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a 
game, and that then when we follow the rules, 
things do not turn out as we had assumed.
That we are therefore as it were entangled in 
our own r u l e s . 54
Here again Wittgenstein offers a contemporary ver­
sion of major points made by Berkeley in both ^  Motu and 
The Analyst. In those works Berkeley insists that the 
principles of science and mathematics are sets of arbi­
trary rules in which we may and often do become entangled. 
We forget that we have made the rules, and we begin to 
posit the real existence of the referents of terms that we 
have used in our definitions and postulates. We become 
entangled in our own rules, and we engage in verbal dis­
putes about non-existent or hypothetical entities. Both
53pi, 114. 54pi, 125.
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men give other examples of verbal disputes in non-soientific 
contexts.
In the Investigations Wittgenstein emphasizes one
of the major points made by Berkeley in the Principles :
A main source of our failure to understand is 
that we do not command à clear view of the use 
of our words. . . . Philosophy may in no way
interfere with the actual use of l a n g u a g e . 55
The above statement reflects the radical difference be­
tween the views of the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus and 
the Wittgenstein of the Investigations. This later view 
is in accord with Berkeley's view that it is both impos­
sible and impracticable to tamper with ordinary language.
We want to establish an order in our know­
ledge of the use of language: an order with a 
particular end in view; one out of many pos­
sible orders; not the order. To this end we 
shall constantly be giving prominence to dis­
tinctions which our ordinary forms of language 
easily make us overlook. This may make it look 
as if we saw it as our task to reform language.
Such a reform for particular practical purposes, 
an improvement in our terminology designed to 
prevent misunderstanding in practice is per­
fectly possible. But these are not the cases 
we have to do with. The confusions which 
occupy us arise when language is like an en­
gine idling, not when it is doing w o r k . 56
Wittgenstein feels that he and others of his con­
temporaries have been misled into looking for the essence 
of language. And this is a grave mistake. The multipli­
city of uses of language can be likened unto the multi­
plicity of kinds of games. If someone asks us to tell him
55 56
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what a game is, is it possible to give a precise, unified 
connotative definition? It is not. If we look at the 
kinds of things called games, we find no one common ele­
ment by which we can mark all games. Games have groups 
overlapping characteristics, none of which is common to 
all games, but some of which are shared by sub-groups. We 
can point to examples of different kinds of games, and 
give the answer, "These and similar things are called 
games." If we search for an essence of games, we are 
searching for an abstract entity that is not to be found. 
Berkeley would say that we are first positing an abstract 
general idea, "essence of games," and then trying in vain 
to discover it. After we examine particular cases, there 
is nothing else to be done. Language is a human invention 
and a human activity. We give names to other sorts of 
activities. Searching beyond the arena of human use and 
human activity for a "real meaning" is fruitless. An 
essential definition is a human contrivance, not a subsis­
tent entity in the realm of Platonic essences. Our lan­
guage leads us astray. Both Berkeley and Wittgenstein 
share this view.
According to both, language is a purposive human 
activity. In order to understand it we must make ourselves 
aware of the job it is doing under any given set of cir­
cumstances. We have listed Berkeley's suggestions. 
Wittgenstein expands the list:
6 4
Giving orders, and obeying them—
Describing the appearance of an object, or 
giving its measurements—
Constructing an object from a description 
(a drawing)—
Reporting an event—
Forming and testing a hypothesis—
Presenting the results of an experiment in 
tables and diagrams—
Making up a story; and reading it—
Play-acting—
Singing catches—
Guessing riddles—
Making a joke; telling it—
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic—  
Translating from one language into another—  
Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, pray­
ing.5?
The similarity of their views about the complexity
of language is paralleled by the similarity of their views
about the instrumentality of language. Wittgenstein's
statement of this position is clear.
Language is an instrument. Its concepts 
are instruments. Now perhaps one thinks that 
it can make no great difference which concepts 
we employ. As, after all, it is possible to 
do physics in feet and inches as well as in 
meters and centimeters; the difference is 
merely one of convenience. But even this is 
not true if, for instance, calculations in 
some system of measurement demand more time and 
trouble than it is possible for us to give 
them.58
The analysis of language for the purpose of clari­
fying concepts is a, if not the, major function of philo­
sophy according to both Berkeley and Wittgenstein. Some 
concepts are better adapted to our human purposes than 
others, so there is always business for the philosopher to
57 58
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(Jo. Both men are interested in developing adequate and 
convenient notations to be used as instruments in mathe­
matics and in the sciences generally. We can, indeed, 
improve our tools, but we must guard against trying to 
mold all of language into a single type of tool, which we 
then attempt to use for all purposes. This is simply 
fruitless. Ambiguity and vagueness are necessary, for 
example, in effecting any sort of compromise between vary­
ing human goals and purposes. For logic and mathematics, 
we might say that we need sharp tools. In areas of axio­
logy more versatile tools are appropriate.
It is also a part of the business of the philosopher 
to clear up misunderstandings stemming from ignorance of 
the nature of language. There is a striking parallel be­
tween Wittgenstein's evaluation of his own work with lan­
guage and the remarks Mrs. Anne Berkeley, wife of the 
Bishop, made about her husband's work. It is interesting 
to compare the following:
Where does our investigation get its im­
portance from, since it seems only to destroy 
everything interesting, that is, all that is 
great and important? (As it were all the 
buildings, leaving behind only bits of stone 
and rubble.) What we are destroying is noth­
ing but houses of cards and we are clearing up 
the ground of language on which they stand.59
Had he built as he has pulled down he had 
been then a Master builder indeed but unto
59PI, 118.
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every man his work. Somemust remove rubbish, 
and others lay foundations while a very few 
have time to go on to perfection.^0
Some of the types of misunderstandings that interest 
Wittgenstein are of an epistemological and psychological 
nature. (Recall that Wittgenstein considers epistemology 
tc be the philosophy of psychology.) He uses language ana­
lysis to clarify the meaning of knowledge and the meaning 
of certainty. He does this by examining concrete cases of 
the uses of these terms, and he shows how some are appro­
priate and some are not. Berkeley proceeds in a like man­
ner. The examination of concrete cases of usage clarifies 
psychological concepts, e.g., unconscious thought, mind, 
spirit. These are discussed in detail in subsequent chap­
ters. Berkeley is concerned with the same sorts of pro­
blems and uses similar techniques of analysis. Relief 
from our perplexities is to be found if we understand 
language doing its job.
"So you are saying that human agreement de­
cides what is true and what is false?"— It is 
what human beings say that is true and false; 
and they agree in the language they use. That 
is not agreement in opinions but in form of
life.61
It is not the specific content expressed by a lan­
guage system that is relevant; it is the fact that any
6®Luce & Jessop, Letter from Mrs. Anne Berkeley to 
her son. Vol. 7, Appendix 88, p. 388.
241.
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content can be e\'picssc(} and bo intclJigiblc that wo need 
to be cognizant of. There is, in the broad sense, an 
underlying logic that shows its utility, and its integrity, 
because it is a universal form of life; or perhaps the 
universal form underlying all possible human life. Spe­
cific languages can and do become outmoded as life forms 
change and evolve, and new games with new rules supersede 
them. But every game has some rules, or it ceases to be ■ 
a game at all. Even though sentences and language do not 
have the formal unity that Wittgenstein imagined at first, 
they do belong to a more or less related family of struc­
tures. We must not try to fit them into the mold of a 
preconceived theory, but rather do away with explanation 
and let description take its place. The philosophical 
problems are solved, not by giving new information, but 
by arranging what we have always known.
CHAPTER V 
GRAMMAR, LOGIC AND PROPOSITIONS
In his systematic development of the doctrine of 
iramaterialism, Berkeley shows how the grammar and logic of 
the language do their jobs, and how propositions are used 
correctly to make assertions about states of affairs and 
incorrectly to make assertions about odd entities such as 
abstract general ideas. Berkeley clarifies his points by 
drawing on examples from psychology, physics and meta­
physics. Wittgenstein attempts to stay strictly within 
the area of logical analysis. Which of the two methods of 
approach is the more successful depends, I believe, on the 
orientation and personal preference of the reader.
Wittgenstein explains the nature of his investiga­
tion in the following manner:
Our investigation is therefore a grammatical 
one. Such an investigation sheds light on our 
problem by clearing misunderstandings away, 
misunderstandings concerning the use of words, 
caused, among other things, by certain analo­
gies between the forms of expression in dif­
ferent regions of language. — Some of them 
can be removed by substituting one form of 
expression for another; this may be called an 
"analysis" of our forms of expression, for the 
process is sometimes like one of taking a 
thing apart.1
They both feel that a proper understanding of the
Ipi, 90.
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nature and functions of language will clear up philosoph­
ical puzzlement, and that the key to understanding of 
reality is language analysis because there is a qualified 
isomorphism between language and reality. Therefore, the 
grammar or logic of any possible language or symbolic sys­
tem shows the common formal structure of being and knowing. 
Wittgenstein makes this point explicit in his discussion 
of the relation between objects, facts, and propositions. 
Berkeley shows this to be the case by his doctrine of 
sense data standing as signs in the language of the author 
of nature. Both men are aware that we cannot get outside, 
beyond, or above that common ground in order to talk about 
it. Neither Berkeley nor the later Wittgenstein believe 
that a meta-language is possible. Neither believe that 
ordinary or common language can be changed, tampered with, 
or in any sense idealized, although Wittgenstein seems to 
vacillate on this point in the Tractatus. Berkeley held 
the view consistently, and Wittgenstein stated explicitly 
in the Investigations, that if one were to attempt the 
idealization of language, the attempt would have to be 
based on an implicit presupposition that there is some­
where an existent ideal of language toward which one is 
striving. But what could this possibly mean? Ideal for 
what purpose, in relation to what? Berkeley speaks of the 
genius and bent of ordinary language which is admirably 
suited to its purpose as a vehicle for the attainment of 
human purposes and goals.
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Hoth Berkeley and Wittgenstein do believe that
language is a form of life, an activity whose rules are
buried deep within that activity itself, and these rules
are the grammar or logic of the language.
The true end of speech, reason, science, faith, 
assent, in all its different degrees, is not 
merely, or principally, or always the imparting 
or acquiring of ideas, but rather something of 
an active operative nature, tending to a con­
ceived good. . . . For instance, the algebraic
mark, which denotes the root of a negative 
square, hath its use in logistic operations.2
A rule stands there like a sign post.
— Does the sign-post leave no doubt open about 
the way I have to go? . . .  Or rather: it
sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes 
not.3
Berkeley lists various related forms of life, each 
of which has a specific set of operational rules which 
tend to a human purpose or conceived good. It is clear 
from Berkeley's further analysis, that if the rules lead 
us astray, they need to be re-examined and revised. But 
we need not, in fact must not, be deceived by our opera­
tional rules. If we stop midway in our process and reify 
an arbitrary functional sign, we shall certainly be lead 
into error.
Wittgenstein points out another aspect of the pro­
blem. The grammar, the rules, are like sign-posts. They 
have instrumental value and help us to find our way about, 
but are not always, and cannot in principle be, absolutely
2 q
Ale., 7th d., p. 307. ^PI, 85.
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clear and unambiguous. Both Berkeley and Wittgenstein 
believe that the tools of language can be sharpened and 
refined to achieve greater clarity and proficiency of per­
formance in certain areas. They also feel that if certain 
basic errors are exposed, and the language model is under­
stood, philosophers will be more comfortable; the "mental 
cramps" (Wittgenstein's terra) stemming from a certain 
rigidity of the mind will be removed.
The terms grammar and logic refer to that set of 
rules which is implicit and shows itself in any symbolic 
system. A system, by definition, is intelligible. Sym­
bolic carries in its connotation the sense of having a 
meaning, and system carries in its connotation order. If 
there is meaning and order at all, rules of some sort are 
implicit. These rules are the grammar or the logic of 
language.
Both Berkeley and Wittgenstein realize that we can­
not get outside the system in order to talk about the sys­
tem. In the first place, we must assume at least some of 
the very rules we are trying to discover and clarify. 
Secondly, as Berkeley would put it, we do not have an idea 
of the rules. They are not given in experience. They in­
volve operations of the mind. If we were to talk about 
them as though they had a real existence, we should be 
making the error of positing abstract general ideas. The 
rules according to which the mind operates are prior to
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and the necessary condition for that operation. Hence, 
they are transcendental. They are the necessary condition 
for human reason. In this same vein Wittgenstein writes: 
"Logic is not a theory but a reflexion of the world. Logic
is transcendental."4
Both Berkeley and the later Wittgenstein feel that 
the transcendental rules cannot be hypostatized and set 
out as clear and unambiguous guide posts for finding one's
way about. On the subject of rules Berkeley comments as
follows :
Those men who frame general rules from the 
phenomena, and afterwards derive the phenomena 
from those rules, seem to consider signs rather 
than causes. A man may well understand natural
signs without knowing their analogy, or being
able to say by what rule a thing is so or so.5
Berkeley is clarifying the ambiguous use of the term rules. 
General rules, such as those of Newtonian science, are 
actually inductive hypotheses. But his contemporaries 
make deductions from these hypotheses and claim certainty 
for their conclusions. Berkeley is pointing out that the 
certainty involved stems from the rules men have developed 
for their system of signs, not from the relations of ideas 
themselves. The rules by means of which God orders ex­
perience are transcendental and beyond the grasp of human 
knowledge. Thus Berkeley writes that "A man may well 
understand natural signs without knowing their analogy, or
^T, 6.13. ®PHK, sec. 108.
73
being able to say by what rule a thing is so or so."6 
(italics mine.)
Berkeley's insight in the above passage accords with 
Wittgenstein's discussion of the meaning of the term 
understand. "The grammar of the word 'knows' is evidently 
closely related to that of 'can,' 'is able to.' But also
closely related to that of 'understands.' ("Mastery" of
a technique.)"? What does it mean to understand something? 
Both Berkeley and Wittgenstein are saying that to under­
stand something, whatever it might be, is able to
operate with or about that something. It is to be able to 
put it to use, not to give a list of so-called causes, or
to cite a set of rules. In other words, the rules show
themselves in the situation so that the appropriate actions 
can be performed, but one cannot get behind the rules and 
point them out and say, "See, this is the way it is. These 
are the rules." Rules in this sense refer to the logic 
that Wittgenstein calls transcendental, in the sense that 
anything that is unsayable, yet makes itself manifest, is 
transcendental. We might call this the ontological grammar. 
For Wittgenstein it is both an ontological and logical 
necessity, as we have seen, and for Berkeley it is God's 
language. The only rules about which we can and do have 
certainty are the arbitrary systems of signs which ^  have
Gfbid. 7pi, 150.
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developed to help us find our way about. Tliese are the 
necessary conditions for the intelligibility of human ex­
perience .
Berkeley warns the reader that even though
. . . There is a certain analogy, constancy, 
and uniformity in the phenomena or appearances 
of nature, which are a foundation for general 
rules: and these are a grammar for the under­
standing of nature, or that series of effects 
in the visible world whereby we are enabled to 
foresee what will come to pass in the natural 
course of things;®
that we should also be cognizant of the following:
. . . And as it is very possible to write 
improperly through too strict an observance 
of general graramar-rules: so in arguing from
general rules of Nature, it is not impossible 
that we may extend the analogy too far, and by 
that means run into mistakes.9
Berkeley is cautioning the reader to beware of falling into
the trap of setting up a system of operational rules to
effect some particular purpose, and when that set of rules
has served its purpose to consider the formal structure of
the set of rules as an end in itself.
As in reading other books, a wise man will 
choose to fix his thoughts on the sense and 
apply it to use, rather than lay them out in 
grammatical remarks on the language; so in 
persuing the volume of Nature, it seems to be 
beneath the dignity of the mind to affect an 
exactness in reducing each particular pheno­
menon to general rules or showing how it fol­
lows from them.10
®S, sec. 252. Opi^ K, sec. 108.
^®PHK, sec. 109.
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Berkeley's polemical remarks are, in this instance, 
directed towards those who, enchanted with the tidiness of 
Newtonian mechanics, endeavour to reduce the universe to a 
mechanical universe, and God to only a master mathemati­
cian. Applied more generally, it is a caution against 
logic-chopping and nit-picking in philosophy. Berkeley 
is also warning his reader not to read into nature an ex­
actness and completeness of detail that may exist only in 
the abstract formulae. For instance, the literal existence 
of a Euclidean point in nature is not entailed by geometry, 
and those who suppose the contrary make needless trouble 
for themselves. He urges his audience to see what is 
meant by experience in general, to see how it can be 
turned to the benefit of man rather than trying to focus 
on rules for their own sake. Wittgenstein refers to be­
coming entangled in our rules.
Both men have similar views about the grammar-logic- 
rules trio which forms the bridge between being and know­
ing, which makes any possible world possible. Wittgenstein 
asks :
In what sense is logic something sublime?
For there seemed to pertain to logic a pecu­
liar depth— a universal significance. Logic 
lay, it seemed, at the bottom of all the sci­
ences. — For logical investigation explores 
the nature of all things. It seeks to see to 
the bottom of things and is not meant to con­
cern itself whether what actually happens is 
this or that. — It takes its rise, not from 
an interest in the facts of nature nor from 
a need to grasp causal connexions: but from
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an urge to understand the basis, or essence 
of everything empirical. Not, however, as if 
to this end we had to hunt out new facts; it is, 
rather, of the essence of our investigation 
that we do not seek to learn anything new by 
it. We want to understand something that is 
already in plain view. For this is what we seem 
in some sense not to understand.12
Both Berkeley and Wittgenstein repeatedly point out 
what they feel is obvious— that nothing is hidden. All is 
in plain view. Philosophers have the urge to misunderstand 
due to a certain professional myopia. What is given is 
the empirically given from which we make inferences. We 
can see that certain things are necessary to reason, but 
not what is necessary to reason, because this lies behind 
reason as necessary condition, and as such it is not given. 
It shows itself. All that we need to know and can know is 
there in plain sight. The positing of odd entities and 
the subsequent search to find those odd entities has been 
the great philosophical sickness.
One person might say "A proposition is 
the most ordinary thing in the world" and 
another: "A proposition— that's something
very queer!:— And the latter is unable sim­
ply to look and see how propositions really 
work. The forms that we use in expressing 
ourselves about propositions and thought stand 
in his way.13
According to the author of the Tractatus, proper 
philosophy is therapeutic, and the key to the solution of 
philosophical problems by language analysis is to be found
12pi, 98. I3pl, 93.
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in the understanding of the nature, uses, and functions 
of propositions, the carriers of meaning, the vehicles of 
expression. At the time of the writing of the Tractatus, 
Wittgenstein feels that the internal structure of the pro­
position as well as its logical form can be elucidated 
(i.e., shown). The structure is exemplified in concrete 
instances. Berkeley does not share this optimism. He 
holds that the attainment of the advantages of clarity of 
understanding, i.e., the solution of the philosophical 
problems,
. . . Doth presuppose an entire deliverance
from the deception of words, which I dare 
hardly promise myself; so difficult a thing 
it is to dissolve an union so early begun, 
and confirmed by so long a habit as that be­
twixt words and i d e a s . 14
In the Introduction to the Principles, Berkeley 
points out the many ways in which language is used. Witt­
genstein arrives at Berkeley's position in the Investi­
gations , where he rejects the picture-model and applies the 
game-analogy to propositions. Here he notes that there is 
no essence of a proposition, but rather a family of utter­
ances which we term propositions which have no one feature 
common to all.
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein explains that the pro- 
positional sign is the sign through which we express the 
thought, and the proposition is the expression of the
14
PHK, Introduction, sec. 23.
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thought. There is a distinction between the two. The 
necessity for the distinction is shown by the following 
example: If one were learning a foreign language and had
learned the rules of pronunciation, he might read aloud 
from a text: "Hinter NOrten stand die Sonne hoch un
glftnzend am himrael." He could do this without understand­
ing the meaning of the sentence. In this case, the spoken 
words would not be a proposition, but a prepositional 
sign-T-the possibility of a propositional sign in its pro­
jective relation to the world.
To the proposition belongs everything which be­
longs to the projection; but not what is pro­
jected. Therefore the possibility of what is 
projected but not this itself.15
The above statements mean that the proposition pic­
tures a possible state of affairs, but that the actual 
state of affairs, the object terminus, of the projection 
does not belong to the proposition. It must be this way 
if truth or falsity can be predicated of propositions. A 
proposition says how things are. When the actual state of 
affairs is other than what the proposition says, the pro­
position is false.
Elementary propositions are expressions of atomic 
facts. Complex propositions are expressions of complex 
facts. Complex propositions can be analyzed into elemen­
tary propositions. These cannot be further analyzed.
^^T, 3.13.
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G. E. M. Anscombe lists five theses which hold for ele­
mentary propositions:
(l) They are a class of mutually independent 
propositions.
They are. essentially positive.
They are such that for each of them there 
are no two ways of being true or false, 
but only one.
(4) They are such that there is in them no 
distinction between an internal and an 
external negation.
(5) They are concatenations of names, which 
are absolutely simple signs.16
These five theses are based on Wittgenstein's con­
cepts of facts and objects, signs and symbols, and the 
picture-model. If the objects are independent of each 
other, thesis (l) stands. If the picture-model is an ac­
curate analogy, thesis (2) is entailed. That is, if a 
proposition is a projection, it is something positive.
Its falsity stems from a structural error— some element in 
the pictures is displaced. There is a picture, however. 
Theses (3), (4), and (5) all involve the simplicity of 
signs, and these are grounded in the simplicity or atomi­
city of facts, and even more fundamentally in the existence 
of the logically simple objects. Here is where we run 
into difficulty. Wittgenstein, working with his analogies, 
metaphors, similes, and models is nonetheless unable to 
give examples of atomic facts or of objects. He does not 
say that it is not possible, but that it is the business
l^Anscombe, op. cit., p. 31.
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of empirical psychology to do so. Nor does Anscombe in 
lier explanations of the five theses give examples of a 
simple sign or simple name. She does give examples of 
complex names (e.g., Wittgenstein) and shows that this is 
what a simple name is not. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein 
does not offer a criterion for simplicity. In one sense 
it seems that he has run into a dead-end. He postulates 
these simples because they are both logically and onto- 
logically required, and he works out a formal system of 
logic in which they play the fundamental role, but he is 
unable to say what they are. I believe that it is at this 
juncture that Berkeley would accuse Wittgenstein of postu­
lating the existence of abstract general ideas. Wittgen­
stein needs the logically simple in order to account for 
the fact that language is significant. "The postulate of 
the possibility of the simple sign is the postulate of the 
determinateness of the sense.
Berkeley's ontological-psychological approach offers 
a more intelligible solution. The sense data provide 
grounds for the determinateness of the sense of proposi­
tions about matters of fact, and otherwise instrumentalism 
is the criterion. The sense data are the signs of the lan­
guage of the author of nature. Although Berkeley uses 
other terms, he subscribes to the view that sense-data
1?T, 3.23.
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statements belong to but one of a vast.number of possible 
and actual language-garaes. For him, as for the later 
Wittgenstein, contextual simplicity is a derivative of the 
use of the relevant terms. Wittgenstein develops this 
position in detail in the Investigations.
Before turning to the concept of the proposition 
as it is presented in the Investigations, it is interest­
ing to note how Wittgenstein's logical theory (using logic 
in the narrow sense) evolves from his theory of proposi­
tions .
It is clear that everything which can be 
said beforehand about the form of all propo­
sitions at all can be said on. one occasion.
For all logical operations are already con­
tained in the elementary propositions. For 
"fa" says the same as " (3x)/fx • (x=aj^7"
Wherever there is composition, there is already relation, 
or, as Wittgenstein puts it, argument and function. All 
logical constants are implicit in the general form of the 
proposition. We select the notation arbitrarily, accord­
ing to convenience of use, but the general form of the 
proposition shows itself, prior to being given any nota­
tion. This is similar to Berkeley's theory that the sense 
data perceived are already organized before the perceiver 
marks them by arbitrary signs. Wittgenstein writes fur­
ther that:
The general form of proposition is the 
essence of proposition. . . .  To gi,ve the
1®T, 5.47.
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essence of proposition means to give the es­
sence of all description, therefore the es­
sence of the world. . . The description of 
the most general prepositional form is the 
description of the one and only general primi­
tive sign in logic.19
The restriction of world to that which can be de­
scribed by propositions as they are defined by Wittgen­
stein would not be agreeable to Berkeley. As we have seen, 
he wrote to Molyneux that grammar, hence logic, is not re­
stricted to the syllogistic. It seems equally apparent 
that he would object to reserving the term logic to mark 
any formal system of prepositional calculus. Berkeley 
claims that all rules for discourse of any type whatsoever 
contain, or rather are, logic. As the later Wittgenstein 
writes, the rules are sign-posts that show us the way we 
are to go about our activities in the world. They show us 
how to follow a path, so to speak. When we lose our way, 
we have taken the wrong turn. Perhaps the sign-post is 
ambiguous and we have misread it. How do we know which is 
the right path? What is the criterion for right? Both 
Berkeley and the later Wittgenstein say that fulfillment 
of human purpose, and lack of confusion are the criteria.
We are confused when we become entangled in our rules.
The instrumental role of the rules is suggested by 
one of Berkeley's few direct comments on relations. He 
asserts :
19
T, 5.471, 5.4711 and 5.472.
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Signs may imply or suggest the relations of 
things; which relations, habitudes or propor­
tions as they cannot be by us understood but 
by the help of signs, so being thereby expressed 
and confuted, they direct and enable us to 
act with regard to things.^®
The above, when coupled with Berkeley's statement that
the reason why we can demonstrate so well 
about signs is that they are perfectly ar­
bitrary and in our power, made at pleasure. ^
is a point of departure for a discussion of the proposi­
tion as seen by the author of the Investigations The 
gist of Wittgenstein's final position has already become 
clear from the foregoing He does not write much about 
propositions in the Investigations, but rather makes his 
points almost entirely by presenting concrete cases which 
are intended to show what he means by the concept propo­
sition.
But haven't we got a concept of what a 
proposition is, of what we take "proposition" 
to mean?— Yes; ust as we also have a concept 
of what we mean by "game." Asked what a pro­
position is— whether it is another person or 
ourselves that we have to answer— we shall 
give examples and these will include what one 
may call an inductively defined series of pro­
positions. This is the kind of way in which 
we have such a concept "proposition."^^
This is a radical departure from his former view­
point, in which he did aver that there was one general 
formula for all propositions. To avoid the charge of in­
consistency, since I have remarked that Wittgenstein did
ZPAlc., 7th d., p. 307. 732.
2 2 ^ ,  135.
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not abandon, but rather altered his viewpoint, I maintain 
that Wittgenstein still allows that the general formula is 
useful insofar as it is the foundation of symbolic logic 
(one of the possible and actual language games), and that 
symbolic logic is a useful tool of analysis in certain in­
stances. But as a universal, fixed definition for all pro­
positions, the general formula is not merely inadequate, 
but meaningless. He shows that it is meaningless by noting 
that the general formula is a disguised tautology.
At bottom, giving "This is how things are" as 
the general form of propositions is the same as 
giving the definition: a proposition is what­
ever can be true or f a l s e . 23
We could say either, "this is how things are" or, 
"this is true." If we say that a proposition is whatever 
can be designated as true or false, it is the same as saying 
that we call something a proposition in our language when we 
apply the calculus of truth-functions to it. But when we do 
this we are basing our definition of a proposition on the 
concepts of truth and falsity. This seems to point to the 
existence of a standard of truth and falsity which is inde­
pendent of propositions, and by means of which we can test 
our utterance to see if it fits. However, neither Wittgen­
stein nor Berkeley holds this view. For both philosophers, 
truth and falsity are defined as properties which can be 
predicated of propositions; thus the general form of
^^PI, 136.
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propositions, as noted in the passage cited above, cannot be 
defined. Any definition becomes a petitio and tells us 
nothing. We can show how a proposition is formed by citing 
rules of sentence-formation and rules for the use of signs 
in the language-game. The use of the words true and false 
may be among the components of the game, but the upshot is 
that we cannot get outside the game to point to the rules.
The laws of logic cannot obey further logical laws. Our 
understanding of propositions is inductive. We see what they 
d o , not what they are absolutely.
Berkeley is in agreement with the foregoing comments 
on defining or understanding propositions by reference to 
their truth and falsity, or, as he terms it, agreement or dis­
agreement of ideas. He remarks:
As to what we are told of understanding propo­
sitions by perceiving the agreement or disagree­
ment of ideas marked by their terms, this to me 
in many cases seems absolutely f a l s e .
He illustrates his point by an interesting and amus­
ing example. He has the idea of a particular dog named Mel- 
ampus. From this he forms the proposition: "Melampus is an
animal." Now, according to Berkeley's view, it is impossible 
that animal should be either an ideal archetype or a subsis­
tent genus. In either case, we should be lead into absurdity:
For in the proposition we have instanc'd in, it 
is plain the word animal is not suppos'd to 
stand for the idea of any one particular animal,
2 4
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for if it be made to stand for another dif­
ferent from that which is marked by the name 
Melampus, the proposition is false and in­
cludes a contradiction. And if it be made to 
signify the very same individual that Melampus
doth, it is a t a u t o l o g y . 25
Berkeley considers both contradictions and tautologies to 
be senseless in the same way that Wittgenstein does, as 
we shall see. They involve operations about signs, and do 
not act as sign-posts directing us to the proper attending 
to our affairs.
Reference was made to the problem of the logical 
simples, basic to the understanding of a proposition 
(supra, pp. 62-63). Wittgenstein left some questions un­
resolved in the Tractatus. He gives his solution in the 
Investigations. He presents a long series of examples 
which he summarizes as follows:
We use the word "composite" (and therefore 
the word "simple") in an enormous number of 
different and differently related ways. . . .
Is this length of 2 cm. simple, or does it 
consist of two parts, each 1 cm. long: But
why not of one bit 3 cm. long, and one bit 
1 cm. long measured in the opposite direction?
To the philosophical question: "Is the visual
image of this tree composite, and what are 
its component parts?" the correct answer is:
"That depends on what you understand by 'com­
posite.'" (And that is of course not an ans­
wer, but a rejection of the question.)^®
Others of Wittgenstein's examples show that the con­
text and use are the criteria of his concept of simplicity. 
He urges his readers to look and see how a term is used. 
This accords with Berkeley's view.
25lbid. 47.
87
Berkeley, insofar as he turns his attention directly 
to the topic, lists four or possibly five kinds or propo­
sitions. The type or kind depends on the way in which the 
copula functions in a given instance. Wittgenstein
deals with the same topic in the same way. It is interest­
ing to compare the two views because it is generally
thought that the discovery of the multiplicity of varia­
tions of the meaning of ^  is a contemporary discovery. 
Berkeley writes:
There are four sorts of propositions.
Gold is a metal.
Gold is yellow.
Gold is fix't.
Gold is not a stone.
Of which the first, second, and third are only 
nominal and have no mental propositions ans­
wering them.27
Also of non-coexistence as gold is not blue.28
Wittgenstein writes:
What does it mean to say that the "is" in
"the rose is red" has a different meaning
from the "is" in "twice two is four"? If it
is answered that it means that different rules 
are valid for these two words, we can say that 
we have only one word here.— And if all I am 
attending to is grammatical rules, these do 
allow the use of the word "is" in both con­
nexions.— But the rule which shews that the 
word "is" has different meanings in these sen­
tences is the one allowing us to replace the 
word "is" in the second sentence by the sign 
of equality, and forbidding this substitution 
in the first sentence.
*  * *
27pc, 793. 793a.
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One would like to speak of the function of 
a word in this sentence. As if the sentence 
were a mechanism in which the word had a par­
ticular function. But what does this function 
consist in? How does it come to light? For 
there isn't anything hidden— don't we see the 
whole sentence? The function must come out 
in operating with.the word.29
Berkeley does not elaborate further on his comment 
about propositions, but I believe that one can assume from 
the general tone of his writings that he is suggesting 
several things. First, that in the case of the first 
three propositions he listed, there is no material or sub­
stantial existent idea to which metal, yellow, and fix't 
refer. Therefore, we cannot define propositions on the 
basis of existing or subsisting simples, as the early 
Wittgenstein tried to do. Secondly, he is suggesting that 
the or copula predicates in subtly different ways in. 
each of the five examples. In the case of metal, the 
means that gold has certain characteristics which are sim­
ilar to the characteristics of other entities, and because 
of the similarities, which relations are mental acts, all 
have a "right" to be called metal. The second use of 
indicates that gold has among its other sensible proper­
ties, the sense datum yellow. Perhaps it would be more 
accurate to say that the sense datum yellow is among the 
cluster of sense data which form the stable pattern to 
which we give the name "gold". In the third instance
29
PI, 558 and 559.
8 9
(l‘ix*t), refers to the maintaining of stability under 
varying circumstances. The fourth example refers to ex­
clusion, and he explains the fifth. The whole point is, I 
think, that Berkeley feels that we cannot pin down propo­
sitions to a set of definitions without considering their 
jobs, their uses, and their suitability to a particular 
purpose, or their instrumental value. This accords with 
Wittgenstein's later view that there is no essence of pro­
position, but rather a series of overlapping functions 
performed by the propositions of the language.
In summary, both Berkeley and Wittgenstein rely upon 
an elucidation of the language-model to show how the tran­
sition is made from knowing to being. Both feel that lan­
guage deceives us in that it leads us to posit odd enti­
ties, and then we become puzzled if those odd entities do 
not make themselves manifest in reality. Both insist that 
nothing is hidden, all is there in plain sight. If we 
understand the multiplicity of functions, uses and jobs a 
language is supposed to be doing, we understand all there 
is to know. The rules of the language are imposed on the 
language by the nature of reality itself, and these rules 
are transcendental. We cannot get outside of the language 
system to examine the rules; but this is not necessary, 
for the rules show themselves in and through the various 
language-garaes.
CHAPTER VI 
EPISTEMOLOGY
Both Berkeley and Wittgenstein are specifically con­
cerned with the following questions: (l) What is to count
as significant discourse? (2) What are the criteria of 
meaning or significance? (3) What is the nature of and 
criterion of truth? These are episteraological questions. 
Berkeley struggles throughout his philosophical career to 
develop one consistent theory which will provide adequate 
andwers. The Wittgenstein of the Tractatus gives one ans­
wer, and the Wittgenstein of the Investigations another.
The first, however, can be considered a special case of 
the second.
Berkeley's sensitivity to the complexity of the 
problem is evident in his repeated apologies for his lack 
of clarity which he attributes to inadequacies of the lan­
guage. He implores his reader to
. . . Blame me not if 1 use my words sometimes
in some latitude. 'Tis what cannot be helpt.
'Tis the fault of language that you cannot 
always apprehend the clear and determinate 
meaning of my words.1*
For, language being accomodated to the 
praenotions of men and use of life, it is 
difficult to express therein the precise 
truth of things, which is so distant from
1
PC, 636.
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their use, and so contrary to our praeno­
tions . 2
This plea for understanding recurs throughout his 
philosophical writings. He has no problem with the sig­
nificance of empirical statements. They are based on his 
doctrine of ideas, which has been explained. But mathe­
matical, logical, axiological and raentalistic or mind 
statements must not be excluded from the realm of signifi­
cant discourse. I am using the term mind to include all 
that class of statements referring to mind, spirit, I^, 
person, etc. Berkeley delineates his problem thus: "Truth
Three sorts thereof: natural, mathematical, and moral.
In the context of the corpus of his writings, we 
know that Berkeley is not insisting on relativity of truth, 
but is rather searching for appropriate criteria of mean­
ing for the three types of statements that fall into the 
above categories. He realizes that one criterion— i.e., 
ideas— will not suffice. We shall summarize his conclu­
sions about the appropriate criteria in each case.
De Motu is Berkeley's most complete work on physical 
science. This is where we find his discussion of the cri­
teria of meaning for the propositions of the natural 
sciences. The concept of divine sensible language is of 
central importance here. From experience we observe tbat 
certain congeries of sense data form stable patterns, and
 ;------------------------ i----------------:------------------
TVV, sec. 35. PC, 6,76.
9 2
we give these stabilities names. Secondly, we observe 
regular patterns of events; conjunctions, sequences, simi­
larities— in short all the sorts of occurrences which we 
lump together under the principle of causality. Berkeley 
cautions us repeatedly, as Wittgenstein does two centuries 
later, that everything is there before us in plain sight.
We must not seek occult powers or odd entities such as 
material substance. ’’Sceptics claim the real essence, the 
internal qualities, and constitution of every /sic^/ the 
meanest object, is hid from our view.”'^
Berkeley claims that physical bodies are nothing 
but the perceived qualities. Their appearance is their 
reality. The repetitions and sequences of appearances or 
ideas or events are generalized into laws of nature, which 
are nothing more than the regularities, similarities, or 
analogies that we experience. These are descriptive. Once 
we have established these laws, in which we cannot discern 
necessity, we endeavour to show how the various observed 
phenomena accord with the laws. We may, says Berkeley, 
speak of the causal process if we like, but we must not 
mistake this for an essentialist explanation, e.g., that 
gravity is the cause of the attraction between bodies says 
no more than that it has been observed that bodies attract 
one another. There is no occult force called gravity which
4pHK, sec. 101.
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somehow inheres in bodies. This is how men have been mis­
lead by the doctrine of abstract general ideas.
It is not, however, in fact the business of 
physics or mechanics to establish efficient 
causes, but only the rules of impulsions or 
attractions, and, in a word, the laws of mo­
tions and from the established laws to assign 
the solution, but not the efficient cause, of 
particular phenomena.5
He writes further:
From the foregoing it is clear that the follow­
ing rules will be of great service in determin­
ing the true nature of motion: (l) to distin­
guish mathematical hypotheses from the natures 
of things; (2) to beware of abstractions; (3) 
to consider motion as something sensible, or 
at least imaginable; and to be content with 
relative measures. If we do so all the famous 
theorems of the mechanical philosophy by which 
the secrets of nature are unlocked, and by 
which the system of the world is reduced to 
human calculation, will remain untouched; and 
the study of motion will be freed from a thou­
sand minutiae, subtleties, and the abstract 
ideas. And let these words suffice about the 
nature of motion.®
He warns us that the scientist must abandon the 
search for efficient causes, and stick with description and 
generalization; that mathematical hypotheses must- not be 
confused with empirical observations; that abstractions 
must not be hypostatized; and finally, that space, time, 
and motion are relative. This is the crux of Berkeley's 
philosophy of science, which is amazing in its modernity.
His criterion of meaning in the area he refers to 
as natural truth is essentially empirical. It is an early
5 6DM, sec. 35. Dm, sec. 66.
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version of the verification theory. We form hypotheses or 
generalizations from observed phenomena (congeries of 
sensible qualit.es); from these generalizations or laws of 
nature, we make deductions and check out the conclusions 
against experience, against observation data. It is well 
to remember, however, that although we cannot discern neces­
sity in the given patterns and sequences, what is given 
does have an external or objective ground insofar as God 
is the ultimate source from which the given stems. Since 
the given is fixed and universal, there is an objective 
standard by which we can judge our hypotheses to be cor­
rect or incorrect. Our experienced ideas are the immediate 
criteria of significance for scientific statements.
The determinant of significance for mathematical 
statements, the criterion for mathematical truth, is 
utility. Mathematical and logical systems are arbitrarily 
chosen sets of symbols manipulated in accordance with ar­
bitrary but consistent sets of rules which are convenient 
and helpful notations. These enable us to perform certain 
mental or experimental operations and to predict the re­
sults following from various hypotheses. All of mathe­
matics and logic is based on tautology, according to 
Berkeley, so the question of truth, in the strict sense 
does not arise. The question of significance does, however, 
because logic and mathematics are useful in helping man 
adapt his attitudes and actions to the observable laws of
9 5
nature. They are useful instruments which enable men to
predict and control.
One who understands the notation of numbers, by 
means thereof is able to express briefly and 
distinctly all the variety and degrees of num­
ber, and to perform with ease and dispatch sev­
eral arithmetical operations by the help of 
general rules. Of all which operations as the 
use in human life is very evident, so it is no 
less evident that the performing them depends 
on the aptness of the notation. . . .  I imagine 
one need not think much to be convinced that 
the science of arithmetic, in its rise, opera­
tions, rules and theorems, is altogether con­
versant about the artificial use of signs, names 
and characters.?
From this it follows that the criterion of meaning 
in the case of mathematics, and concomitantly logic, is 
the utility of the arbitrary sign system in fulfilling its 
intended purpose. Berkeley knows that it is perfectly pos­
sible to account for any given phenomenon by more than one 
hypothesis. It is obvious from his doctrine in De Motu 
that he would be perfectly at home in the contemporary 
scientific milieu. With more sophistication than Kant, 
Berkeley writes of Newton and Torricelli that although 
they seem to be disagreeing with one another.
They each advance consistent views, and the thing 
is sufficiently well explained by both. For 
all forces attributed to bodies are mathematical 
hypotheses just as are attractive forces in 
planets and the sun. But mathematical entities 
have no stable essence in the nature of things;
and they depend on the notion of the definer.
Whence the same thing can be explained in 
different ways.8
7 Q
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Finally, moral truth, which belongs to the category
of mind or soul, needs an entirely different criterion of
meaning. It is unfortunate that Part II of the Principles
was lost on Berkeley's trip to Italy, because we do not
have a clear and complete record of the development of his
moral philosophy and doctrine of the soul. Perhaps we can
glean from his scattered comments about problems in this
area, what he would hold the criterion of significance for
moral statements to be. He writes:
There are two supreme classes of things, body 
and soul. By the help of sense we know the
extended thing, solid, mobile, figured, and
endowed with other qualities which meet the 
senses, but the sentient, percipient, thinking 
thing we know by a certain internal conscious­
ness. Further, we see that those things are 
plainly different from one another, and quite 
heterogeneous. I speak of things known; for 
the unknown it is profitless to speak.9
Thus, Berkeley claims that the soul is known and that we 
know it by internal consciousness. This internal con­
sciousness of things spiritual he terras notions. He claims 
that we have immediate and direct experience of our own 
soul or mind, since we can at will direct the movements of 
our limbs, etc. The soul, spirit, or mind, is essentially 
active. "A thinking, active thing is given which we ex­
perience arj the principle of motion in ourselves. This we 
call soul, mind, and spirit."19
Q in
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Berkeley also makes it clear that the criteria of 
meaning in the three cases we are discussing are very dif­
ferent .
If anyone were to extend natural philosophy be­
yond the limits of experiments and mechanics 
so as to cover a knowledge of incorporeal and 
unextended things, that of soul, mind, or vital 
principle. But it will be more convenient to 
follow the usage which is fairly well accepted, 
and so to distinguish between the sciences as 
to confine each to its own bounds; thus the 
natural philosopher should concern himself en­
tirely with experiments, laws of motions, me­
chanical principles, and reasonings thence de­
duced; but if he shall advance views on other 
matters, let him refer them for acceptance to 
some superior science. For from the known 
laws of nature very elegant theories and mechan­
ical devises of practical utility follow; but 
from the knowledge of the Author of nature 
Himself by far the most excellent considera­
tions arise, but they are metaphysical, theo­
logical, and moral.11
The trend of Berkeley's discussion about the cog­
nitive import of value statements is that faith is a 
practical attitude which affects conduct directly. There 
is evidence for the existence of God (divine visual lan­
guage) which is just as adequate as the evidence for scien­
tific hypotheses, if not more so. The function of both 
science and faith is to promote human happiness. The moral 
statements stemming from the Christian faith can be veri­
fied, or rather they draw their cognitive significance 
from the observed utilitarian criteria which are analogous 
to the criteria that are used in the sciences.
^^DM, sec. 42.
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A discourse, tlioicl'orc, tliai directs how to act 
or excites to the doing or forbearance of an 
action may, it seems, be useful and significant, 
although the words whereof it is composed should 
not bring each a distinct idea into our m i n d s . 12
The reasoning that we use for discourse spiritual 
and moral is neither more nor less involved with analogy 
and with the manipulation of signs than is scientific dis­
course. It would seem correct to say that in scientific 
discourse it is the content of God's sensible language 
that we attend to, and from which we form the laws of na­
ture. In the case of moral and spiritual discourse, it is 
that God speaks to us and speaks in a coherent manner that 
is the proof of His existence and the foundation of spirit­
ual and moral significance.
The perspectival differences between Berkeley and 
Wittgenstein are evident in the discussion of the topics 
treated in this chapter. Since Wittgenstein approaches 
philosophy from the standpoint of a logician interested in 
the foundations of logic and in adequate notation, rather 
than as a metaphysician interested in the total nature and 
purpose of man and being, his approach is far more restricted 
in scope than Berkeley's. In the Tractatus Logico- 
Philosophicus, Wittgenstein deals with seven specific areas 
of logic and language. Metaphysics, epistemology, theology, 
and psychology are "out"— for the reasons already discussed.
^^Alc., 7th d., p. 292.
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Wittgenstein gives stipnlative definitions for the terms 
meaning, sense, senseless, and nonsense, which are the 
topics for discussion in this chapter.
He stipulates that the term meaning shall refer to 
the relation between primitive sign and object. Primitive 
signs are those that cannot be further analyzed, i.e., 
names.
The meanings of primitive signs can be ex­
plained by elucidations. Elucidations are 
propositions which contain the primitive signs.
They can, therefore, only be understood when 
the meanings of these signs are already known.
. . . Only the proposition has sense; only in
the context of a proposition has a name mean­
ing.13
Wittgenstein uses the terra elucidation a number of times, 
but nowhere does he explain his usage precisely. However, 
in the above passage, he seems to be saying that how the 
sign representing the object is meant can only be shown 
by the placement of the sign in the context of a proposi­
tion where its relation to other signs is shown by the 
copula, logical constants, etc. But, taking this into con­
sideration, before the proposition can be understood, a 
range of possibilities of meaning for at least some of the 
signs must already be known. We have here the chicken-egg 
problem. Green, written as it is at the first of a sen­
tence with a capital letter means nothing in itself. It 
could be used in a proposition as someone's proper name, a
13
T, 3.263 and 3.3.
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color, a term signifying inexperience, youth, an adjective 
signifying envy— a multiplicity of things. The proposi­
tion in which the term Green is used would elucidate the 
meaning of the sign. But if possibilities of application 
of the signs were totally unknown, the proposition itself 
could not be understood.
It is Wittgenstein's tenet that names mean, and 
that propositions have sense. "Only facts can express a 
sense, a class of names cannot."14
Referring back to the discussion of propositions, 
we recall that a proposition is the expression of a fact.
A fact is the object or objects in their given relations. 
Facts are that which can be thought; thus, they are intel­
ligible.
We understand the sense of the prepositional 
sign, without having it explained to us. . . .
The proposition is a picture of reality, for 
I know the state of affairs presented by it, 
if I understand the proposition. . . . The 
proposition shows its sense. . . . Every pro­
position must already have a sense; assertion 
cannot give it a sense, for what it asserts is 
the sense itself. And the same holds of de­
nial, etc. . . . What can be shown cannot be 
said. . . . The sense of a proposition is its 
agreement and disagreement with the possibilities 
of the existence and non-existence of the 
atomic facts.15
Wittgenstein stipulates that propositions have sense; there­
fore combinations of. words which do not have sense are not
14t , 3.124.
15
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to be classified as propositions. Further, since the pro­
position is a picture of reality, and its sense stems from 
its agreement or disagreement with the possibilities of 
the existence and non-existence of atomic facts, we have 
a criterion of significance which, for Wittgenstein, ap­
plies to all propositions. We might summarize the doctrine 
of the Tractatus by saying that Wittgenstein admits as 
significant only those types of statements which correspond 
to Berkeley's statements about natural truth. These, of 
course, are the scientific statements. Wittgenstein puts 
all propositions in this category. "The right method of 
philosophy would be this. To say nothing except what can 
be said, i.e., the propositions of natural science.
Wittgenstein's comments relevant to philosophy of
science are similar to Berkeley's.
And now we see the relative position of logic 
and mechanics. (We could construct the network 
out of figures of different kinds, as out of 
triangles and hexagons together). That a pic­
ture like that instanced above can be described 
by a network of a given form asserts nothing 
about the picture. . . .  So too the fact that 
it can be described by Newtonian mechanics 
asserts nothing about the world; but this as­
serts something, namely, that it can be de­
scribed in that particular way in which as a 
matter of fact it is described. The fact, 
too, that it can be described more simply by 
one system of mechanics than by another says 
something about the world. . . . Mechanics is 
an attempt to construct according to a single 
plan all true propositions which we need for 
the description of the world. . . . Through
l^T, 6.53.
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their whole logical apparatus the physical 
laws still speak of the objects of the world.
. . . ¥e must not forget that the description
of the world by mechanics is always quite 
general. There is, for example, never any 
mention of particular points in it, but always 
only of some points or other.17
Compare the above with the following passage from Berkeley's
De Motu.
And just as geometers for the sake of their 
art make use of many devices which they them­
selves cannot describe nor find in the nature 
of things, even so the mechanician makes use 
of certain abstract and general terms, imag­
ining in bodies forced action, attraction, 
solicitation, etc. which are of first utility 
for theories and formulations, as also for 
computations about motion, even if in the 
truth of things, and in bodies actually exist­
ing, they would be looked for in vain, just 
like the geometers' fictions made by mathe­
matical abstraction.18
Similarly, the following cluster of entries in the 
Tractatus seem almost a paraphrase of Berkeley's corre­
sponding entries in De Motu.
Although the spots in our picture are geomet­
rical figures, geometry can obviously say 
nothing about their actual form and position.
But the network is geometrical, and all its 
properties can be given a priori. Laws, like 
the law of causation, etc., treat of the net­
work and not what the network describes.
The process of induction is the process of as­
suming the simplest law that can be made to 
harmonize with our experience. . . . This pro­
cess, however, has no logical foundation, but
I'^ T, 6.342, 6.343, 6.3431 and 6.3432. 
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only a psychological one. It is clear that 
there are no grounds for believing that the 
simplest course of events will really happen.
. . . That the sun will rise to-morrow, is an 
hypothesis; and that means that we do not know 
whether it will rise. . . .  A necessity for 
one thing to happen because another has hap­
pened does not exist. There is. only logical 
necessity.19
In summary, then, the type of significant discourse 
that Berkeley discusses under the heading of natural truths, 
is, for Wittgenstein, the only significant discourse. For 
both, we arrive at the laws of nature by inductive reason­
ing. The sets of generalizations which describe the ob­
served regularities which are manifested in natural occur­
rences are given preference on the bases of adequacy and 
simplicity. There is no natural necessity, for either 
philosopher; only logical necessity. We can speak mean­
ingfully only of that for which there is a criterion of 
significance. Here, Wittgenstein restricts significance to 
observed phenomena which lend themselves to observation and 
description. The metaphysical foundation (although this 
statement would be an anathema to Wittgenstein) for Witt­
genstein's doctrine is the existence of objects, whatever 
they may be, and Berkeley's doctrine is grounded in divine 
sensible language.
Wittgenstein's discussions of mathematical and 
logical systems correspond to Berkeley's category of mathe­
matical truth. Strictly speaking, statements in this
IQ
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category do not liave moaning or sense 1‘or either oi the 
two philosophers. Wittgenstein makes a distinction be­
tween statements that are senseless and statements that 
are nonsense. Logical statements (i.e., tautology and 
contradiction) are senseless. Statements in which the 
terras have no meaning are nonsense. Senseless statements 
are our concern here. Berkeley is in agreement with Witt­
genstein on this point, although he would accord a utili­
tarian significance to mathematics and logic, as indeed, 
does Wittgenstein.
The proposition shows what it says, the 
tautology and the contradiction that they say 
nothing. The tautology has no truth-conditions, 
for it is unconditionally true; and the contra­
diction is on no condition true; Tautology and 
contradiction are without sense. (Like the 
point from which two arrows go out in opposite 
directions.) (l know, e.g., nothing about the 
weather, when I know that it rains or does not 
rain.) . . . Tautology and contradiction are,
however, not nonsensical; they are part of the 
symbolism in the same way that "0" is part of 
the symbolism of Arithmetic. . . . Roughly 
speaking: to say of two things that they are
identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing 
that it is identical with itself is to say 
nothing.20
The concurrence with Berkeley's doctrine is obvious:
"A thing is identical with itself." There 
is no finer example of a useless proposition, 
which yet is connected with a certain play of 
the imagination. . . .  A stone is a stone.
This is a nonsensical proposition and such as 
the solitary man would never think on. Nor do 
I believe he would even think on this: viz.
20t , 4.461, 4.4611 and 5.5303.
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The whole is equal to its parts, etc. . . .
Homo est Homo etc. comes at last to Petrus 
est Petrus etc. Now if these identical pro­
positions are sought after in the mind they 
will not be found. There are no identical 
propositions. This is all about sounds and 
terms.^1*
For both Berkeley and Wittgenstein, the logical 
statements are analogous to arithmetical or mathematical 
statements:
Numbers are nothing but names, never words.
. . . Ideas of utility are annexed to numbers.
. . . In arithmetical problems men seek not 
any idea of number. They only seek a denomi­
nation. This is all that can be of use to 
them. . ... Take away the signs from arith­
metic and algebra and pray, what remains?
. . . These are sciences purely verbal and 
entirely useless but for practice in societies 
of men. No speculative knowledge, no comparing 
of ideas in them.22*
In general, Wittgenstein and Berkeley agree about 
the nature of logic and mathematics. We have noted that 
Wittgenstein remarks that logic (taken in the broad sense) 
is transcendental, while the notation and systems of rules 
are arbitrary and chosen or invented for adequacy and con­
venience. Both agree that which system is used is set by 
convention, but the mere fact that some system or other is 
necessary to make experience intelligible does say some­
thing about the world. There is no doubt that if Berkeley
^IpC, 216, 592 and 728.
^^PC, 763, 765, 766, 767, and 768.
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agreed to accept Wittgenstein's stipulated meaning of 
senseless, he would also term the utterances of logic and 
mathematics as senseless or without sense.
The final member of the trio of types of discourse 
mentioned by Berkeley includes mentalistic and axiological 
discourse. Propositions about these topics would be cate­
gorized as nonsense by Wittgenstein. It is at this junc­
ture that there is a wide rift between the two thinkers. 
Let us consider some of Wittgenstein's relevant comments:
All propositions are of equal value. . . . The 
sense of the world must lie outside the world.
In the world everything happens as it does 
happen. ^  it there is no value— and if there 
were, it would be of no value. If there is a 
value which is of value, it must lie outside 
all happening and being-so. For all happening 
and being-so is accidental. What makes it 
non-accidental cannot lie the world, for 
otherwise this would again be accidental. It 
must lie outside the world. . . . Hence also 
there can be no ethical propositions. Propo­
sitions cannot express anything higher. . . .
It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed.
Ethics is transcendental. . . .  Of the will 
as the subject of the ethical we cannot speak.
And the will as a phenomenon is only of in­
terest to psychology.
* * *
There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows 
itself; it is the mystical.
* * *
My propositions are elucidatory in this way: 
he who understands me finally recognizes them 
as senseless, when he has climbed out through 
them, on them, over them. (He must, so to 
speak, throw away the ladder after he climbed
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up on it.) He must surmount these proposi­
tions; then he sees the world rightly.23
Wittgenstein limits cognitive significant discourse 
to the propositions of the sciences. Berkeley refuses to 
do so and endeavors to develop a logic of notions which 
one could only wish he had completed. In summary, Berkeley 
writes :
Three sorts of useful knowledge. That of 
coexistence to be treated of in our Principles 
of Natural Philosophy, that of relation in 
mathematics, that of definition, or inclusion, 
or words (which perhaps differs not from that 
of relation) in morality.24*
Wittgenstein's doctrine in the Investigations does 
not lend itself so well to analysis in terms of the three 
categories we are discussing. In one sense the whole cor­
pus of the work is relevant to the concept of meaning. 
Wittgenstein is trying to show that the question of mean­
ing is, in itself, not a legitimate question. The Investi­
gations is a body of elucidations. These elucidations are 
couched in the form of metaphor, simile, and analogy. The 
gist of the entire Investigations might be summed up in 
this passage: "For a large class of cases— though not for
all— in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be de­
fined thus: The meaning of a word is its use in the lan­
guage ."25
‘^T, 6.4, 6.41, 6.42, 6.421, 6.423, 6.522 and 6.54,
24pc, 853. 25pi, 43.
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This is, I think, in line with Berkeley's doctrine. 
Language, in its multiplicity of ramifications, is a tool, 
a utilitarian instrument, designed to enable man to get 
about in his life's affairs as conveniently and as com­
fortably as possible. Wittgenstein feels that too many 
philosophers from Augustine to the present day (including 
the author of the Tractatus) have been deluded by a sim­
plistic concept of language and meaning. According to 
Wittgenstein, St. Augustine felt that the individual words 
in the. language name objects, and that sentences are com­
binations of such names. This is a vast oversimplification.
In this picture of language we find the roots 
of the following idea: Every word has a mean­
ing. This meaning is correlated with the word.
. . . If we look at /thi^Z example, we may per­
haps get an inkling how much this general no­
tion of the meaning of a word surrounds the 
working of language with a haze which makes 
clear vision impossible. It disperses the fog 
to study the phenomena of language in primitive 
kinds of application in which one can command a 
clear view of the aim and functioning of the 
words. A child uses such primitive forms of 
language when it learns to talk. Here the 
teaching of language is not explanation, but
training.26
Wittgenstein invents primitive language games as 
examples, and shows how, even in these, the jobs words do 
are far more varied and complex than had been previously 
supposed. It is a mistake to consider language a mirror 
of reality. Language is one human activity, albeit an 
important one,, among many. It would not make sense to call
26pi, 1 and 5,
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other types of human activity "mirrors or pictures of 
reality"— nor does it make sense to apply this appellation 
to language. There is no one feature common to all sorts 
of uses that language has, nor to the jobs that it does.
We have already discussed the game analogy. Wittgenstein 
writes, "We see that what we call 'sentence* and 'language' 
has not the formal unity that I imagined, but is the family 
of structures more or less related to one a n o t h e r . " ^ 7
If, therefore, there is no common characteristic to 
language, it would be futile to search for the criterion 
of significant discourse. It would seem to follow that 
the best we can do is consider the elements of discourse 
in total context, and endeavor to discern if it seems to 
be fulfilling its function. (And this would be an extremely 
difficult task.) Berkeley limits significant discourse to 
three types, as we have seen. Wittgenstein of the Investi­
gations would deny the possibility of this, and argue that 
we can work only with concrete cases. There is no warrant 
for believing that there is a function of language and a 
common feature that makes language what it is. In the 
Investigations, Wittgenstein's program is clarification, 
by use of example, of the multiplicity of jobs that a lan­
guage does. It is not an attempt to answer questions 
about meaning.
27pi, 108.
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Neither Berkeley nor Wittgenstein is primarily 
interested in episteraological problems per se, as we have 
previously indicated. Berkeley is preeminently a practical 
philosopher. He is combating scepticism and atheism above 
all. His interests lie in determination of the good, abun­
dant, and happy life for man in this world, the possibility 
of which is based on the goodness of God, who speaks to man 
by means of the signs of sensible language. The natural 
sciences are to be explored and developed, since they are 
the means by which God's language is interpreted and turned 
to the benefit of man. Berkeley is interested in finding 
the ground for significant discourse in three areas as we 
have seen: science, mathematics, and axiology. He is
interested in problems of knowledge and certainty, but he 
does not make a distinction between his theory of meaning 
and a theory of truth. The criteria he advances for what 
he calls the three kinds of truth, are, in actuality, cri­
teria for the meaningfulness of propositions, not for the 
truth of propositions.
It is probable that his epistemological doctrines 
were more fully developed in the lost second part of the 
Principles. Of this we have only a few hints in his early 
notebooks and elsewhere in his writings. We can see his 
struggles with the problems of knowledge and certainty in 
the following entries in his notebooks;
Ill
It seems to me that we have no certainty 
about ideas, but only about words. 'Tis im­
proper to say "I am certain I see, I feel, 
etc." There are no mental propositions formed 
answering to these words and in simple percep­
tion 'tis allowed by all there is no affirma­
tion or negation and consequently no certainty.28
In this passage he seems to be moving toward the 
view that it is improper to use the terra certainty in con­
junction with the given in experience. It would be foolish, 
for example, to say "1 am certain 1 feel pain; 1 am certain 
1 see a patch of red." Since what is given is given, it 
adds nothing to say "1 am certain." There would be no evi­
dence that could count against an immediate internal or
external perception. Evidence could be brought to bear
only against a mediate perception which contains an element 
of judgement or interpretation.
But Berkeley changes his mind and writes, "This 
seems wrong, certainty, real certainty, is of sensible 
ideas pro hie and nunc. 1 may be certain without affirma­
tion or negation."29*
Berkeley now decides that we can legitimately use the term 
certainty to apply to the immediately given. He is puzzled 
here, 1 believe, about the proper use of language, not 
about the nature of the given itself. He expresses further 
thoughts on this general problem in his notebooks.
Knowledge or certainty or perception of
agreement of ideas (as to identity and .
28 29
PC, 731. PC, 731a.
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diversity and real existence) vanishetli— be- 
cometh merely nominal. Coexistence remaineth.
Locke thought in this later our knowledge was 
little or nothing, whereas in this the only 
real knowledge seemeth to be f o u n d . 3^^
Locke's doctrine is that all knowledge is the per­
ception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas.
There are four types of possibilities: (l) ideas may be
identical or not; (2) they may be related in some respect 
(taller than, father of, for example); (3) they may coexist 
in the same substance or subject; and (4) they may or may 
not have a real existence outside the mind.31 Berkeley 
disagrees with Locke's account of knowledge. According to 
Berkeley, identity statements are senseless (without sense) 
and give us no knowledge. The problem of real existence 
outside the mind vanishes with the doctrine of ideas. Re­
lational statements are nominal, as in mathematics. This 
leaves the field of coexistence, which is the true field 
of knowledge. It is knowledge of the properties of things, 
the area of scientific discourse, which depends on the con­
nection of the sign with the thing signified. A briefer 
statement of Berkeley's doctrine follows: "We must with
the mob place certainty in the s e n s e s . "32
30pc, 739.
31john Locke, ^  Essay Concerning Human Understand­
ing , ed. A. C. Fraser. 2 vols. Oxford., 1894., Bk. IV.
32pC, 740.
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We do not obtain knowledge from any,of tbe logical 
processes. Real knowledge, as Berkeley chooses to use the 
term, comes from the data of the senses. The relations of 
ideas are operational procedures for working with or using 
the knowledge which comes to us via the senses. Relations, 
for Berkeley, stem from a mental act. Here we see Berkeley 
thinking through the kinds of jobs that words do. He de­
cides that the terms knowledge and certainty are misapplied 
to mental processes such as relations and the arbitrary use 
of signs and symbols which we call logic. Knowledge and 
certainty are terms properly applied to matters of coex­
istence— the proper subject matter of the sciences. But I 
am certain of the simple sensibles in the same sense that 
I cannot question the truth or falsity of logical statements, 
because the question of truth or falsity just cannot be 
raised. The difference between logical or mathematical 
propositions, and propositions about sense data, is that 
the former are arbitrary sign systems of human invention, 
and the latter are externally and internally given ideas, 
the totality of which comprises experience.
Wittgenstein struggles with the same problems that 
concern Berkeley regarding the use of the concepts knowing 
and being certain. Norman Malcolm recounts an exchange 
between G. E. Moore and Wittgenstein on this subject.^3
B^Malcolm, op. cit., pp. 87-92.
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Wittgenstein reacts to Moore's famous dictum "I know that 
this is a hand." Wittgenstein contends that using I know 
with sense datum statements is silly. The use of the
phrase has no clear meaning here. It is redundant, for
there is a point at which there is no longer a question of
making more certain. The phrases I know or I ^  certain 
would be equally redundant in connection with certain 
logical utterances. Therefore sense datum statements 
based on the given, or on immediate experience, are akin 
to statements of logic. Wittgenstein goes further in his
analysis and makes a distinction between knowing and being 
certain.
Experiential propositions do not all have 
the same logical status. With regard to some, 
of which we say that we know them to be true, 
we can imagine circumstances on the basis of 
which we should say that the statement had 
turned out to be false. But with others there 
are no circumstances in which we should say 
"it turned out to be false."
Moore's propositions— "1 know that 1 am a 
human being,' '1 know that the earth has ex­
isted for many years," etc.— have this charac­
teristic, that it is impossible to think of 
circumstances in which we should allow that 
we have evidence against t h e m . 34
Wittgenstein says that Moore's reply to the sceptics 
who claim that he does not know missed the point. When 
Moore insists that he does know, he is reporting on his 
psychological state of certainty, but that is not the 
issue. The sceptics are trying to make a logical point.
34
Ibid., pp. 90-91.
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The sceptics are trying to get the point across that degree
of certainty is the degree of psychological conviction.
What is needed is to show them that the highest 
degree of certainty is nothing psychological hut 
something logical: that there is a point at
which there is neither any "making more certain" 
nor any "turning out to he false." Some exper­
iential statements have this property. Some 
others are related in various ways to those 
that have this property. Thus we can give a 
logical justification of the use of "I know" 
with experiential statements.35
This is, I helieve, the decision that Berkeley reached.
Regarding Berkeley and a theory of truth, we can 
say that he certainly does not hold a correspondence theory 
This is eliminated hy his doctrine of ideas. We perceive 
ideas directly, and the ideas are reality. Perception is 
reality. To he is to he perceived and to perceive. There 
can he no error in what is immediately given to me. State­
ments ahout ideas involve hoth interpretation and relation. 
These are mental acts. Questions of truth and falsity do 
not enter into perception itself, hut into propositions 
ahout perceptions. Error, for Berkeley, depends on will.
We make hasty judgments, erroneous interpretations. Nor 
does Berkeley hold a coherence theory of truth. He does 
not discuss consistent sets of propositions. Rather, 
Berkeley holds a pragmatic or utilitarian theory of truth 
that is inextricably involved with his theory of meaning. 
God, through His divine sensible language, arranges
35
Ibid., p . 91.
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experience so that, by careful attention, man can know how 
to act in the world. If we interpret the data of exper­
ience in appropriate ways, and act accordingly, we can ex­
pect certain results to ensue. If our expectations are 
fulfilled, our interpretations or propositions about the 
given are true. If our expectations are not fulfilled, 
falsity or error has crept into the system. Berkeley warns 
the reader:
Once more I desire ray reader may be upon 
his guard against the fallacy of the word. Let 
him beware that I do not impose on him by 
plausible empty talk that common dangerous way 
of cheating men into absurdities. Let him not 
regard my words any otherwise than as occa­
sions of bringing into his mind determined sig­
nifications. So far as they fail of this they 
are gibberish, jargon, and deserve not the 
name of language. I desire and warn him not 
to expect to find truth in my book or anywhere 
but in his own mind. Whatever I see myself, 
it is impossible I can paint it out in w o r d s . 36*
This admonition is, in a way, comparable to Wittgen­
stein's penultimate statement in the Tractatus, which 
statement has been cited; namely, that his propositions 
are elucidatory because those who understand him recognize 
them as senseless. The reader must surmount the proposi­
tions; then he sees the world rightly. Both philosophers 
are trying to say, I think, that the truth is not to be 
found in words, but, in the last analysis, truth is open 
and in view of everyone— truth and experience are one.
36pc, 696.
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In contrast to Berkeley, the Wittgenstein of the 
Tractatus has a carefully delineated theory of truth which 
follows from the picture-theory of language. A proposi­
tion is analogous to a picture of reality, a projection. 
When the elements of the picture correspond to the states 
of affairs, the proposition is true. A false proposition 
is also a picture. It is something "positive." However, 
the elements of the picture do not correspond to the ele­
ments in the state of affairs. The proposition or picture 
does not represent what it is intended to represent. It 
does not represent an actual state of affairs, but a pos­
sible state of affairs. Every proposition that is think­
able represents a possible state of affairs, but only true 
propositions represent actual states of affairs. Therefore, 
there are many more possible than actual states of affairs.
If Wittgenstein is offering a correspondence theory 
of truth it shares the difficulties common to all corre­
spondence theories. If we are to take the above brief ex­
planation at face value, how do we get "behind" the picture 
to the reality in order to compare the two? Wittgenstein's 
truth theory is made more complex by the introduction of 
the concept of objects. The arrangement of objects (given) 
determines logical form, and logical form is shared by lan­
guage and reality. It belongs both to the picture and to 
the states of affairs. From one point of view, if we take 
Wittgenstein's statements at face value, it would be
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difficult to see how error is possible at all. That is, 
if the objects are given, and logical form is determined 
by the objects (which hang together like the links of a 
chain), and logical form, in turn, determines the sense of 
propositions, there is no room for error. Whatever it may 
be, Wittgenstein's theory of truth seen in this light is 
not a correspondence theory. All metaphysics, for Witt­
genstein, is nonsense, so he offers no metaphysical expla­
nation of falsity. I cannot see that he resolved the prob­
lem. His answer would be that there is no problem because 
the question itself cannot be asked.
The Wittgenstein of the Investigations tries to 
show that philosophical theories of any sort are a mani­
festation of the special sort of sickness to which philo­
sophers are susceptible. Philosophy, Wittgenstein claims, 
is clarification and description, not theorizing. A theory 
of truth would be as serious a symptom as any other philo­
sophical theory. He subsumes the (to him) pseudo-problem 
of truth and falsity under the concept of instrumentalism- 
contextualism. Just as Berkeley did not make the distinc­
tion between meaning and truth before the great age of 
epistemology, so Wittgenstein does not make it as the in­
terest shifts from epistemology to language analysis. I 
believe that this additional correlation between the two 
men stems from the basic similarity of their philosophical 
tempers. Wittgenstein would admit the value of those pro­
positions to which the properties of truth and falsity
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belong, as instruments in one of the many types of language 
games. As life-forms change, (and this includes language, 
which is one component of the total life-form) the jobs, 
roles, functions, and uses of language change concomitantly 
To talk about truth, however, as an absolute and outside 
the context of any language game, would be to talk non­
sense. Such a concept as the theory of truth is simply 
without meaning.
CHAPTER VII 
PSYCHOLOGY
Among the language games that men play, that which 
centers on the cluster of mind terms is the most proble­
matic. Both Berkeley and Wittgenstein are aware that it 
is here that the grammar of the language lead-s philosophers 
into mazes and muddles that are exceptionally difficult to 
overcome. There are three major problems. First, the 
erroneous doctrine of abstract general ideas leads to the 
assumption that mind is an existent substrate which sup­
ports or contains ideas. This error corresponds to the 
postulate of material substance as the thing which sup­
ports qualities. Secondly, a complex set of difficulties 
stems from the fact that there is a cluster of mind words 
which are sometimes used synonymously in ordinary language, 
and sometimes not. Some of the troublesome mind words are 
2, myself, soul, spirit, thinking, substance, subject, 
consciousness, ego, etc. Berkeley, in particular, strug­
gles with this problem. Finally, there is the problem of 
infinite regress when I attempt to examine my mind, recog­
nizing that it is with my mind that the survey must be 
made. This I must stand outside the mind, so to speak. 
Wittgenstein calls this the fallacy of the angelic view­
point. How do Berkeley and Wittgenstein solve the problems 
of mind?
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Berkeley uses two approaches. One of these Is the 
method of language analysis, and the other is a method 
that today is called phenomenology. Wittgenstein also ap­
proaches the problem in two ways. His remarks on the 
philosophical 1 in the Tractatus comprise the mystical ele­
ment to which his commentators often refer.1 In the In­
vestigations Wittgenstein abandons the mystical and uses 
the techniques of ordinary language analysis. He shows 
how mind terms are used in particular cases. Berkeley's 
use of analytical techniques is analogous to that of the 
Investigations. Berkeley's use of phenomenological tech­
niques shows some correlation to elements in the Tractatus. 
This latter element in Berkeley has also been called 
mystical.2 The similarities and differences of Berkeley's 
and Wittgenstein's approaches to the problem of mind are 
the subject of the following discussion.
Heretofore, this thesis has been restricted to a 
discussion of those elements of Berkeley's philosophy 
which show a direct correlation with contemporary analytic 
philosophy. However, Berkeley's method of doing philosophy 
is not limited to language analysis. He attacks the prob­
lems which interest him with whatever tools seem appropriate
^Anscombe, op. cit., Ch. 13.; Maslow, op. cit.,
4.2, 4.3, 4.4.
^Waheed Ali Parooqu, "Berkeley's Ontology and 
Islamic Mysticism", New Studies in Berkeley's Philosophy, 
op. cit., pp. 123-24.
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In some instances his method is a proto-phenomenology.3 
John Wild writes, "Husserl, who has, in general, under­
stood the English "Empiricists" more adequately than most 
commentators, defines abstraction in exactly Berkeley's 
sense.
In order to do justice to Berkeley's concept of 
mind and related concepts, it is essential to consider 
some of the phenomenological correlations as well as the 
analytic. We shall discuss the phenomenological aspects 
first. Both phenomenology and analytic philosophy are 
techniques of analysis rather than philosophical systems. 
Phenomenology is the descriptive analysis of whatever ap­
pears to be consciousness. It claims to be entirely pre- 
suppositionless and to be the most radical of empiricisms.5 
With these tenets, Berkeley is in complete agreement. 
Although Berkeley's language is different, he urges de­
scriptive, hence allegedly presuppositionless, accounts of
3peter Koestenbaum, "Introduction", The Paris Lec- 
tures, by Edmund Husserl (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1964.)
^Wild, op." Git", P - 115n.
^Note the similarity to Wittgenstein's position;
"We must do away with all explanation, and description 
alone must take its place." (FT, 109) A comparative 
study of analytical and phenomenological methodologies 
would be enlightening. Mas low writes that "Progress in 
this area has been modest; i.e. in any comparison between 
phenoraenologists, Husserl in particular, and Wittgenstein. 
Prom the point of view of history of ideas, there are 
indeed resemblances, but they fail to stand up to a closer 
inspection of the actual ideas of the two philosophers. A
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experience. He shows the major source of unexamined as­
sumptions and outlines a way to remove them from thought. 
He says that words have been used unreflectively for such
a long time that they have become incrusted with unexam-
insd meanings. This conviction is common to both analytic 
philosophy and phenomenology.
Since therefore, words are apt to impose on 
the understanding, whatever idea I consider,
I shall endeavor to take them bare and naked 
into my view, keeping out of my thoughts, so 
far as I am able, those names which long and 
constant use has so strictly united with them.6
In the passage above, both the phenomenological and
analytical aspects of Berkeley's method are apparent. By 
implication, he notes that the names to which we are ac­
customed deceive us (the analytical perspective), but he 
also urges us to look deeper than language at raw sensory 
experience. Berkeley says, in short, to stop using lan­
guage in thought, and to examine pure ideas and images. 
Wittgenstein's predominant view is that language and 
thought are synonymous.?
The reader of the Principles is urged to attain the 
same train of thought that Berkeley has. He then escapes 
the danger of being deceived by words. "I do not see how
much more convincing comparison for the sayings of the 
earlier Wittgenstein is to be found in certain thoughts of 
Martin Heidegger. Here a number of parallels appear": 
(Maslov/, op," cit • , p. 167).
^PHK, Introduction, sec. 21. 
?Supra, Chapter IV.
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/ t h e  reader/ can be led into an error by considering his 
own naked, undisguised ideas."®
A further requirement of phenomenological analysis 
is that it be restricted to those features of any given 
object without which it could not be said to be what it is. 
These general, necessary, and invariant features have been 
called essences in traditional philosophy, and the pheno- 
menologists follow that terminological tradition. However, 
the referent is not the same. In phenomenology the object 
of study is whatever appears to consciousness. When the 
investigation is restricted to reflection upon the appear­
ances themselves, phenomenology is free from the uncertain­
ties of the ordinary world of natural experience. Berke­
ley's position is in accord with this. "So long as I con­
fine my thoughts to my own ideas divested of words, I do 
not see how I can easily be mistaken."9
In addition, the phenomenologists concern themselves 
with the problem of constitution— that of showing how com­
plex meanings and meaning structures are built up out of 
simple units of direct experience. Berkeley directs at­
tention to this problem specifically, saying that
A certain color, taste, smell, figure, and 
consistence having been observed to go to­
gether, are accounted one distinct thing, 
signified by the name apple. Other
Q
PHK, Introduction, sec. 25.
9
PHK, Introduction, sec. 22.
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collections of ideas constitute a stone, a
tree, a book, and the like sensible things.10
Particular meanings are, therefore, attached to objects of 
sense perception through experiencing the objects.
Probably the most important feature of phenomenology 
is the requirement that existence be bracketed. It was 
mentioned above that phenomenology claims to be presuppo­
sitionless. This lack of assumption extends to belief in 
the existence of a world exterior to the mind. The sys­
tematic suspension of all beliefs encompasses, if we are 
to be consistent, those stemming from scientific, cultural, 
episteraological and metaphysical systems. A distinction 
should be made here, though, between suspending or bracket­
ing belief and actually doubting existence. Even though 
the philosopher might believe in the existence of an ex­
ternal material world, during the time of his investiga­
tions he temporarily suspends that belief to permit unham­
pered inquiry. Berkeley repudiates belief in that which is 
inaccessible to mind or experience in stating that there is 
no foundation for belief in material substance under any 
circumstances. He claims the sanction of common sense in 
holding to an ordinary, philosophically non-problematic 
"objectivity" for chairs, trees, stones, etc. But Husserl 
does not reject the objectivity of experiences either. In 
fact, his essences guarantee i t . H
lOpHK, sec,
llQuentin Lauer, Phenomenology : Its Genesis and
Prospect (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965J, p. 40.
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Berkeley's linguistic argument for immaterialism 
has already been presented. His phenomenological argument 
is summarized as follows. The primary qualities in Locke's 
system are extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity, and 
number. The secondary qualities are the sensible quali­
ties of color, sound, taste, odor and texture. Berkeley, 
however, claims that primary qualities cannot be said to 
exist without reference to secondary qualities. Since one 
is mind-dependent, the other must be. From a phenomeno­
logical, not linguistic standpoint Berkeley writes:
It is not in my power to frame an idea of a 
body extended and moved, but I must withall give 
it some color or some other sensible quality.
. . . In short, extension, figure, and motion, 
abstracted from all other sensible qualities, 
are inconceivable.12
For Berkeley, these facts combined with his maxim
"to be is to be perceived and to perceive"13 mean that the
primary qualities do not exist as predicates of a material
substance outside the mind. Nor, however, do they exist
in the mind as though they were items in a box.
When I speak of objects as existing in the 
mind or imprinted on the senses; I would not 
be understood in the gross literal sense, as 
when bodies are said to exist in a place, or 
a seal to make an impression upon wax.14
^^PHK, sec. 10,
11
PC, 280, 378, 429, 472, 646, 670; DHP 1st d . , p. 
175; 3rd d. p. 237; S, 251,
14
DHP, 3rd d ., p. 250.
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For Berkeley, the mind is no more a thing or sub­
stratum than is material substance. The passages in which 
he presents this view represent both the phenomenological 
and analytical modes of analysis. It is interesting to 
compare the following group of phenomenological statements 
with his analytical arguments:
Take away the perceptions and you take away 
the mind. . . . Locke seems to be mistaken 
when he says thought is not essential to the 
mind. . . . Each Person's time being measured 
by him by his own ideas. . . . The Understand­
ing seemeth not to differ from its perceptions 
or Ideas.15*
Compare the above with the following:
It is no more than common custom, which you 
know is the rule of language, hath authorized: 
nothing being more usual, than for philoso­
phers to speak of the immediate objects of the 
understanding as things existing in the mind.
Nor is there any thing in this, but what is 
conformable to the general analogy of lan­
guage; most part of the mental operations 
being signified by words borrowed from sensi­
ble things.16
In this quotation Berkeley is speaking from the standpoint 
of language analysis. He points out that language is meta­
phorical in that we use object words analogously to refer 
to mental operations.
Not only does Berkeley believe that the doctrine of 
material substance leads to philosophical error, but the 
doctrine of mental substances does so as well. Using the
^^PC, 580, 650, 590, and 587. '
^®DHP, 3rd d. p. 250.
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language and logic of contemporary phenomenology, which 
"tools" were not available to Berkeley in his day, it is 
possible to reconcile Berkeley's "two concepts of mind"17 
and explain what some of his commentators have referred to 
as gross inconsistencies.^® From the clues and comments 
scattered throughout the corpus of his writings, as well 
as from the considerable number of entires in the notebooks, 
it does appear at first glance that Berkeley holds both a 
substantival and a non-substantival concept of mind. It 
is easy to see why the charge of inconsistency has been 
made, and we shall examine some of his apparently conflict­
ing remarks. It can never be known how he reconciles the 
two aspects of his position in the lost manuscripts. How­
ever, on the basis of the phenomenological distinction 
between positional and non-positional consciousness, I be­
lieve that it is possible to clear up some of the diffi­
culty. In his day, as we have noted, he lacked both the 
terminology and logic with which to express this distinc­
tion. He repeatedly apologizes for this shortcoming. He 
is too able a logician and critical philosopher to be un­
aware of the apparent inconsistencies in his comments on
l^Colin M. Turbayne, "Berkeley's Two Concepts of 
Mind", Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge, ec. by 
Gale Engle and Gabriete Taylor (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1968),
pp. 10-24.
l®Cf Brand Blanshard, "Foreword", New Studies, op. 
cit., v-vii.
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the cluster of terras relevant to ralnd. In the Principles 
he writes:
There is likewise something which knows or 
perceives / T d e a ^ ,  and exercises divers opera­
tions as willing, imagining, remembering about 
them. This perceiving active being is what I 
call mind, spirit, soul, or ra^  self. By which 
words 1 do not denote any one of my ideas, but 
a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein 
they exist, or which is the same thing, whereby 
they are perceived; for the existence of an 
idea consists in being perceived.19
It is my opinion that in the selection above, Berke­
ley is struggling to find an appropriate explanation of 
his position, but misses the mark somewhat. In the first 
sentence he speaks of some thing which knows, wills, etc.
If he is going to write about mind at all, he can hardly 
avoid this way of speaking, since about requires an object 
according to the grammar of the language. Yet Berkeley 
has warned us (l) that language is inadequate for dealing 
wit]^ our concepts, and (2) that the term thing, as he has 
stipulated, refers not only to the object pole of exper­
ience, but to the experiencing subject as well. He seems 
to be groping for an adequate terminology in that he says 
"wherein they exist, or which is the same thing, whereby 
they are perceived." In ordinary language these two 
phrases certainly are not an equivalent pair. The first 
part sounds as though something (ideas) were a container,
so to speak, and tho second half as though there is a
1Q
PHK, sec. 2.
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perceiving agent. Berkeley seems to be trying to avoid 
the imagery of mind as a box or container, but is unable 
to find terras appropriate to express his meaning. He indi­
cates that he uses the terms mind, spirit, soul, and self 
synonraously. He writes, further, that the above terms 
are not insignificant although they do not refer to an 
idea. He claims that they do refer to that which perceives 
ideas and wills and reasons about them. "What I am myself, 
that which I denote by the term is the same with what 
is meant by soul or spiritual substance.
Berkeley insists that he is not making an unneces­
sary verbal distinction by refusing to call the mind an 
idea, even though the immediate significations of many 
other names are ideas. The reason for making the distinc­
tion is that the two types of things are totally different 
in kind. Ideas are entirely passive, in Berkeley's view, 
and their existence consists in being perceived. The mind 
is active and its existence consists in perceiving ideas 
and thinking. "It is therefore necessary, in order to pre­
vent equivocation and confounding natures perfectly dis­
agreeing and unlike that we distinguish between spirit and 
idea."21 He writes further that, "Existence not con­
ceivable without perception or volition. It is not dis­
tinguished t h e r e f r o m . F u r t h e r  he adds that, "Certainly
^®PHK, sec. 139. ^^PHK, sec. 139. ^^PC, 646.
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tho mind always and constantly thinks and we know this 
too; in sleep and trances the mind exists not: There is
no time, no succession of i d e a s . T h e  three comments 
above seem to be evidence against a substantival concept 
of mind. I believe that Berkeley wants to say that mind 
and its synonyms are names given to the stream of con­
sciousness, the stream of experiences, and include in their 
significations the activities of constitution, i.e., will­
ing, understanding, remembering, imagining, etc.
Berkeley has said that the distinction between the 
intellectual and material world is vain. Therefore, the 
distinction between the object pole (ideas) and the sub­
ject pole (mind) of experience in general must lie else­
where. For Berkeley, experience is di-polar. One pole is 
active and the other passive. The poles can be separated 
only conceptually, and even then it is difficult to speak 
of the I pole because the grammar of the language leads 
us into the same sort of difficulty as it does when, mis­
guided by the erroneous doctrine of abstract general ideas, 
we speak of and hypostatize the object pole of experience. 
Berkeley's "two concepts of mind" can best be reconciled 
from the phenomenological perspective. Regarding the sub­
stantival concept, it seems plausible to assume that when 
Berkeley speaks about mind, he is referring to what
^^PC, 651.
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the phenomenologists terra the positional consciousness. 
That is, when I reflect on the operations of ray mind, the 
mind becomes an object for the so to speak. This is 
the attitude of reflective consciousness. It is natural, 
linguistically, to refer to mind and to its contents from 
this perspective; and discourse about mind, accordingly, 
leads to the positing of mind as substantial entity. From 
the other perspective, Berkeley equates mind with the suc­
cession of ideas. Mind is pure stream of consciousness as 
a constitutive activity. In phenomenological terminology,
this is the attitude of non-positional c o n s c i o u s n e s s . 24
This aspect of Berkeley's thought is particularly clear in 
his comments on time and existence: "Duration not dis­
tinguished from existence.... In sleep and trances the 
mind exists not. . . . Eternity is only a train of innum­
erable ideas.
Berkeley is not, I believe, using language analysis 
to arrive at the above position. But neither is Wittgen­
stein in those sections of the Tractatus in which he dis­
cusses the perceiving subject or the philosophical I .  His 
comments on that and related topics bear at least a super­
ficial resemblance to phenomenological procedures.
24jean-Paul Sartre, "Being and Nothingness," 
Masterpieces of World Philosophy, ed. Frank N. Magill 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 1085.
^'^PC, 5, 651, and 14.
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There is therefore really a sense/in which 
in philosophy we can talk of a non-psychological 
I. The I occurs in philosophy through the 
fact that the "world is my world". The philo­
sophical I is not the man, not the human body 
or the human soul of which psychology treats, 
but the metaphysical subject, the limit— not 
a part of the world.
*  -X -X
The subject does not belong to the world but 
it is a limit of the world. . . . I am my 
world. (The microcosm.)
*  * *
The thinking, presenting subject; there is 
no such thing. If I wrote a book "The world 
as I found it", I should also have therein to 
report on my body and say which members obey 
my will and which do not, etc. This then would 
be a method of isolating the subject or rather 
of showing that in an important sense there is 
no subject: that is to say, of it alone in
this book mention could not be m a d e . °
It is interesting to compare this set of comments with the
following remarks of Berkeley:
If you ask what thing it is that wills,
I answer if you mean idea by the word thing, 
anything like an idea, then I say tis no thing 
at all that wills. This, how extravagant 
soever it may seem, yet is a certain truth.
We are cheated by these general terms, things, 
is, etc.27
There are several points of similarity between the 
method and results of the analysis of the ^ pole of exper­
ience conducted by Berkeley and Wittgenstein, and there 
are some differences. Both agree that the I^ is not to be
2Gr, 5.641, 5.632, 5.63, and 5.631.
27
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found as an object within experience. It follows from the 
remarks of both that ohject-language, the language of 
science, is misleading when applied to the subject pole 
of experience.
The following clarifies Wittgenstein's view:
Where in the world is a metaphysical sub­
ject to be noted? You say that this case is 
altogether like that of the eye and the field 
of sight. But you do not really see the eye.
And from nothing the field of sight can it 
be concluded that it is seen from an eye.28
Wittgenstein is saying that it is impossible in principle 
to assume the angelic point of view. The 1_ cannot get 
outside itself, as it were, and make itself an object 
among other objects in the world, since the experiencing 
subject is the outside limit of all possible experiences. 
For any subject, that which is totally outside of exper­
ience is outside the world. The is not an object of 
experience, but the subject of experiences. Wittgenstein's 
analogical presentation is particularly apt, I believe. 
"From nothing in the field of sight can it be concluded 
that it is seen from an eye." Similarly, from nothing in 
the field of experience can it be concluded that it is 
experienced by an ][ - Ve may call the limit of experiences 
the Beyond this we cannot speak. Wittgenstein's
remarks on this subject seem to be phenomenological de­
scription rather than linguistic analysis. He is
28
T, 5.633.
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examining the structure of consciousness, not the gram­
mar of the language. If this opinion is correct, as 
I believe it is, this mode of analysis is another point 
of correlation between Berkeley and Wittgenstein.
Wittgenstein writes further, "There is indeed the
pQ
inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical." ^ 
His final statement in the Tractatus is, "Wliereof one 
cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."30 Wittgenstein 
is not silent, however. He makes two important claims:
(l) he claims that there something beyond the thinkable 
or expressible and (2) he claims that it shows itself. 
Wittgenstein's attitude toward metaphysics seems to vacil­
late in the Tractatus. At times, he seems content to 
write it off as nonsense; but at other times he appears to 
sense what it is that leads philosophers to try to express 
the inexpressible. Even though the result may be nonsense, 
as Wittgenstein uses that term, he does evince a sympha- 
thetic understanding of the motives behind the attempt.
He does claim that nothing can be said about the inexpress­
ible. Implicit in Wittgenstein's claim that the inexpress­
ible shows itself, is the notion that it must be perceiv­
able in the broad sense of the word perceive. Otherwise 
the claim would be meaningless. Wittgenstein thus opens 
the door to another epistemological criterion. The
2®T, 6.522. 30^^ 7.
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perception of that which is shown, but not expressible in 
language, must be an intuitive perception. Expressions of 
intuitive knowledge may be nonsense, according to Wittgen­
stein, but they cannot be entirely without significance 
and it must be a significance that has nothing to do with 
language. This mode, for the author of the Tractatus, 
must be the mystical. "Not how the world is, is the 
mystical, but that it is."31
Wittgenstein uses the term mystical to describe the 
feeling of wonder and awe that anything exists at all, 
and, also, he uses it in a way that includes the sense of 
awareness of the transcendental. That is, insofar as we 
are aware of the inexpressible in the areas of meaning and 
value, our awareness is intuitive or mystical.
On the subject of person Berkeley makes the follow­
ing remarks:
Eternity is only a train of innumerable ideas.
Hence the immortality of the soul easily con­
ceived. Or rather the immortality of the per­
son, that of the soul not being necessary for 
ought we can s e e .  32
He makes a distinction between soul and person, yet his 
own conclusions trouble him as we can see from these re­
marks :
N.B. To use utmost caution not to give the 
least handle of offense to the church or church­
men. . . . The concrete of the will and un­
derstanding I must call mind, not person,
31 32
T, 6.44. PC, 14.
137
lest offense be given; there being but one 
volition acknowledged to be God. Mem: Care­
fully to omit defining of person or making 
much mention of it. . . . The spirit, the
active thing, /T^/ that which is soul; and 
God is the will a l o n e . 33
The above and similar statements are difficult to 
interpret, but I believe it is plausible to conjecture that 
Berkeley is concerned about using the word person to denote 
the 2  pole of experience because of possible offense to 
the church. The term Person is too closely tied to the 
Trinity to be used with regards to the finite in the above 
sense. Hence Berkeley falls back on the term mind, yet I 
have shown that Berkeley seems to be aware that it leads 
to the postulate of spiritual substance analogous to ma­
terial substance, and this is what he is anxious to avoid.
I believe that Berkeley wants to say that eternity is the 
totality of the train of ideas or the infinity of all 
ideas originating in God, Infinite Person, Pure Act, which 
ideas are derivatively constituted (in regard to human 
purposes and goals) by finite persons. This is the mys­
tical element in Berkeley's thought. Further evidence of 
this mystical element is found in Siris, his last philo­
sophical work.
Naturalists, whose proper province it is 
to consider phenomena, experiments, mechani­
cal organs and motions, principally regard 
the visible frame of things or corporeal 
world, supposing soul may be tolerated in
33PC, 715, 713 and 712.
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physics, as it is not necessary in the arts 
of dialling or navigation to mention the 
true system or earth's motion. But those 
who, not content with sensible appearances, 
would penetrate into the real and true causes 
(the object of theology, metaphysics, or the 
philosophia prima), will rectify this error, 
and speak of the world as contained by the 
soul, and not the soul by the world.
*  * *
Now, although such phantoms as corporeal 
forces, absolute motions, and real spaces do 
pass in physics for causes and principles, 
yet are they in truth but hypotheses, nor can 
they be the objects of real science. . . .
But when we enter the province of the philo­
sophia prima, we discover another order of 
beings, mind and its acts, permanent being, 
not dependent on corporeal things, nor result­
ing, nor connected, nor contained; but contain­
ing, connecting, enlivening the whole frame 
and imparting those motions, forms, qualities, 
and that order and symmetry, to all those 
transient phenomena which we term the Course
of Nature.84
In the first of these passages, Berkeley makes the state­
ment that "the world is contained by the soul." This is, 
indeed, close in meaning to Wittgenstein's remark in the 
Tractatus that the subject is the limit of the world, not 
a part of the world. Berkeley says that the soul contains 
the world. Wittgenstein says, "I am my world."
Berkeley's second tool for cutting through the 
cluster of problems associated with mind terms is strictly 
analytical. He uses both the phenomenological and the 
analytical concurrently, however. He writes:
285 and 293.
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That an idea which is inactive, and the exis­
tence whereof consists in being perceived, 
should be the image or likeness of an agent 
subsisting by itself, seems to need no other 
refutation than barely attending to what is 
meant by those w o r d s . 35
Here, he is not urging us to consider our naked ideas or
the contents of our consciousness, but rather to attend to
the ordinary use of the terras in the language. Berkeley
claims the sanction of common sense and claims, as we have
seen, to "side with the mob" is his use of terras. He
writes that
In a large sense indeed, we may be said to 
have an idea, or rather a notion of spirit, 
that is, we understand the meaning of the 
word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny 
anything of it,36
Finally, Berkeley writes in Alciphron that mind words de­
note an active principle, not an idea, and are nonetheless 
significant.
Since I understand what is signified by the 
term I or myself, or know what it means, 
although it be no idea, nor like an idea, but 
that which thinks, and wills, and apprehends 
ideas, and operates about them. Certainly it 
must be allowed that we have some notion that 
we understand, or know what is meant by the 
terms myself, will, memory, love, hate, and so 
forth; although to speak exactly, these words 
do not suggest so many distinct ideas.3?
Berkeley states that we do understand and use mentalistic
language. Such language is significant even though there
3^PHK, 137. 36PHK, sec. 140.
3?Alc., 7th d., p. 292.
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are no ideas, strictly speaking, to which mind terms refer. 
This is similar to the Wittgenstein of the Investigations. 
In this later work, Wittgenstein has eradicated most 
traces of the mystical element which, though not central 
to the doctrine of the Tractatus, was apparent. In the 
Investigations, Wittgenstein remarks on the soul in a man­
ner very similar to Berkeley's.
What am I believing in when I believe that 
men have souls? What am I believing in, when 
I believe that this substance contains two 
carbon rings? In both cases there is a pic­
ture in the foreground, but the sense lies 
far in the background; that is, the applica­
tion of the picture is not easy to s u r v e y . 38
In discussing the meaning of saying that a friend is not an
automaton, Wittgenstein writes that
My attitude towards him is an attitude towards 
a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has 
a soul. Religion teaches that the soul can 
exist when the body has disintegrated. Now 
do I understand this teaching?— Of course I 
understand it.39
Wittgenstein suggests in the first of these passages that
we understand what we, and others, mean by the belief that
men have souls, just as we understand what we, and others,
mean when we say that an organic compound has two carbon
rings. Yet the sense of the mental imagery to which the
terms excite our imaginations lies deep. The imagery in
each instance determines our actions. This is brought out
more clearly in the second passage. My attitude toward
^®PI, 422. iv, p. 178.
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a soul, it is implied, would be somewhat different from my 
attitude toward an automaton. And further, I do under­
stand the teaching of religion in respect to the soul. As 
Berkeley remarks, we know what is meant by the words or 
terras, even though they do not suggest specific ideas.
In their comments on the will, the similarities of
the analytical techniques of Berkeley and 'Wittgenstein are
readily apparent. Berkeley writes, "This is folly; to de­
fine volition an act of the mind ordering. For neither act
nor ordering can themselves be understood without voli­
t i o n . "40 Berkeley is urging the reader to attend to the 
grammar and logic of the language. It would be meaning­
less to define volition as suggested above, says Berkeley, 
because volition or will is a part of the meaning of both 
act and ordering. He writes further:
It seems that the soul taken for the will is
immortal, incorruptible. . . , The will is 
purus actus or rather pure spirit; not imag­
inable, not sensible, not intelligible, in
no wise the object of the understanding, no
wise perceivable. . . .  We are imposed on by 
the words will, determine, agent, free, can,
etc.41
We see Berkeley groping for adequate terminology, adequate 
logic, to express his meaning. He is painfully aware that 
most of our mentalistic words are metaphorical. Perhaps 
his thoughts could have been better understood if he had
^°PC, 723.
41
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hit upon the contemporary term stream of consciousness, 
and he comes close to this when he speaks of mind as 
congeries of perceptions. lie reverts to the analytical 
in defending this view when he writes, "Say you the mind 
is not the perceptions, but that thing which perceives. I 
answer you are abused by the words that & thing. These 
are vague empty words without a meaning."^3 Finally, from 
the perspective of the contextualism-instrumentalism dis­
cussed in the last chapter, Berkeley urges the reader to 
observe how the terms are used in specific cases. This is 
another instance in which Berkeley might be considered as 
a precursor of those analytic philosophers who appeal to 
the paradigm-case argument.
"The will is not distinct from particular voli­
t i o n s . "44 other words, the sum of all those particular
acts which are said to be volitions, or acts of the will, 
are the will. It is an easy transition to the view that 
we can see what the will is by examining the instances in 
which the term is used in ordinary language. In a similar 
vein Wittgenstein writes:
When I raise my arm 'voluntarily' I do not use 
any instrument to bring the movement about.
My wish is not such an instrument either.45
More specifically, he writes:
^^PC, 5 8 0 .  4 3 ^ ^  5 8 1 .
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"Willing, if it is not to bo a sort of wishing, 
must be the action itself. It cannot be allowed 
to stop anywhere short of the action." If it 
is the action, then it is so in the ordinary 
sense of the word; so it is speaking, writing, 
walking, lifting a thing, imagining something.
But it is also trying, attempting, making an 
effort— to speak, to write, to lift a thing, 
to imagine something etc.^o
It is interesting to compare the above with Berkeley's 
fuller statement on will: "Will, understanding, desire,
hatred, etc. so far as they are acts or active differ not. 
All their differences consists in their objects, circum­
stances . "'4:7*
Berkeley and Wittgenstein are appealing to paradigm 
cases and to the "grammar" of the situation as it shows 
itself in the language. Berkeley implies that the stream 
of consciousness is undifferentiated act, and that the 
objects or circumstances determine the names we use. Witt­
genstein says willing is the action itself. It is explained 
by an examination of the multiplicity of situations to 
which the term is intelligibly applied. Both Berkeley and 
Wittgenstein seem to be combining the phenomenological and 
analytical modes of investigation of the problem at hand, 
and both are making an implicit appeal to a contextualist- 
instruraentalist criterion of meaning.
There are, as I have shown, similarities in both 
the techniques and the results in the consideration of
^®PI, 615. 47^^ 854.
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problems connected with mentalistic terms. Neither Berke­
ley nor Wittgenstein believes that the mind is a substan­
tial entity which has or contains ideas. Both agree that 
it is the misunderstanding of the grammar of the language 
which leads to this error. Both use both phenomenological 
and analytical techniques in the dissolution of the problem 
Not only do both insist on the need for attention to the 
grammar of the language, but they make use of the data of 
introspection as well. They find, upon introspection, no 
substantial entity, mind or self. Both agree that what 
men refer to as mind, self, soul, or ^  is not given in 
experience, but is the necessary condition for and the 
limit of all possible experience. Secondly, in order to 
select the appropriate mind term for use in a particular 
instance, we can appeal to custom, to ordinary language. 
Even Berkeley said the difference between will, under­
standing, desire, and hatred consists in their objects and 
circumstances. Such and such an observable response to a 
situation would be called desire ; an entirely different 
observable response would be called hatred, etc. Or Witt­
genstein remarks that I treat a person as though he were a 
soul, not an automaton. The point is that the terra gets 
its meaning from the context in which we can observe it 
being applied. All is open to view here. We do not look 
for occult substances or Platonic entities which are 
original models. Finally, the center of experience cannot
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b(! talked about or made into an object of experience, for, 
as Berkeley writes, the soul contains the world, or in 
Wittgenstein's terms, I am my world.
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The most striking similarity in the philosophical 
activities of Berkeley and Wittgenstein is their use of 
the language model as point of departure for the resolu­
tion of philosophical problems. Both show that their 
respective language models rest on an ontic foundation. 
Berkeley claims that God's divine sensible language, 
given to the perceiver as sense data, guarantees a public 
and universal aspect in experience. Wittgenstein shows 
that objects and atomic facts are both logically and onto- 
logically necessary conditions for the intelligibility 
and comraunicability of experience by means of language.
For both, language is, in an important sense, a map of 
reality.
The complexity of the language model reflects the 
multi-dimensionality of human experience, according to 
both philosophers. Early in his philosophical writings, 
Berkeley lists a number of the many functions of language, 
and shows how confusion results from the attempt to limit 
these uses to the cognitive mode— a mode which is appro­
priate to scientific discourse alone. In the Tractatus, 
Wittgenstein, as he later admits, makes this mistake. He
rectifies his error in the Philosophical Investigations,
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which Is a logical development and expansion ol’ Berkeley's 
earlier insights. In the Investigations, Vfittgenstein 
uses the language game model, and, by example, shows how 
language functions as an activity and how it reflects the 
particular game being played. His concern, like Berkeley's, 
is to make the many functions of language explicit, and 
to show how confusion results from a restrictive view of 
language.
Both Berkeley and Wittgenstein claim that the gram­
mar, or the logic of the language, is transcendental 
insofar as it has an ontic foundation, and is the neces­
sary condition for meaningful discourse. The rules show 
themselves in the language, but cannot be brought into 
view, as they are already presupposed by any language 
whatever. The terms marking the ontic elements are chosen 
arbitrarily, but the transcendental rules impress some 
order on that arbitrary notation.
Both men agree that the formal systems of logic 
and mathematics are tautologous and give no information 
about the world. The value and meaning of these systems 
lie in their utility and convenience in ordering human 
affairs. Both agree that the laws of nature are descrip­
tive, but are not to be taken as truths about the nature 
of reality, for no necessity can be observed. The develop­
ment of these doctrines by both Berkeley and Wittgenstein 
has served as foundation for the work of the logical 
positivists.
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In discussing the subject pole of experience, both 
Berkeley and Wittgenstein resort to a modest phenomeno­
logical analysis. The ”1-', for both, is not a thing or 
an entity, but rather the limit or all possible experience, 
thus the limit of the world.
As well as the similarities summarized above, there 
are major differences in the methods of the two philoso­
phers. In spite of the fact that both claim to be anti­
metaphysical, Berkeley can be correctly classified as an 
empiricist who is also a metaphysician. His doctrine of 
immaterialism is a metaphysical theory, and entails a com­
mittment to belief in God's existence. There is a teleo- 
logical aspect in Berkeley's writings which is absent in 
Wittgenstein's analysis. The Wittgenstein of the Tractatus 
develops a metaphysics insofar as his logical objects 
nonetheless perform an ontological function. Nor does 
Wittgenstein entirely avoid references to the theological. 
He writes, "How things stand, is God. God is, how things 
s tand."1
It is illuminating to study the works of Berkeley 
and Wittgenstein together for several reasons. The clar­
ity and organization of Berkeley's writings provide a 
structure in terms of which some of Wittgenstein's more 
obscure passages take on a new clarity. Wittgenstein's 
Investigations is a logical development and amplification
^NB, p. 79.
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of many of Berkeley's earlier insights. Both men write 
with the avowed purpose of resolving philosophical pro­
blems. Berkeley writes that
My purpose therefore is, to try / s i c 7  if I 
can discover what those principles are, which 
have introduced all that doubtfulness and 
uncertainty, those absurdities and contradic­
tions into the several sects of philosophy.^
In the same vein Wittgenstein avers that "The clarity that 
we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this 
simply means that the philosophical problems should com­
pletely disappear."3
Although it would be far from accurate to say that 
Wittgenstein's goal of complete clarity has been achieved, 
it would be correct to say that some of the principles 
which have caused doubtfulness and uncertainty have been 
clarified by the analytical investigations of the two men.
^PHK, Introduction, sec. 4.
3pi, 133.
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